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ABSTRACT
This dissertation focuses on two aspects of globalization: how it impacts inequality and
productivity growth. The Örst two chapters are concerned with inequality, trade and FDI
and are theoretical in nature. The third chapter is an empirical study of productivity growth
decomposition for Chile.
Chapter 1 considers trade and foreign direct investment between two symmetric countries,
where Örms di§er across their productivity and share their proÖt with workers who are assumed
to be homogenous. These Örms serve in a monopolistically competitive output market and can
supply to both foreign and domestic markets. A Örm can choose to supply in the foreign
market via either trade or foreign direct investment. I Önd that, as countries open up new
channels to access foreign market, they increase their inequality and welfare. In the trade and
FDI equilibrium inequality decreases with a decrease in tari§ and an increase in Öxed cost
in investing in the foreign economy. I also Önd that, an access to better technology increases
inequality and increase in rents at Örst increases inequality and then starts to decrease in higher
range.
Chapter 2 relaxes the country symmetry assumption and allows for only trade between
north and south. A prospective entrant in the north has a better chance of obtaining higher
productivity relative to a prospective entrant in the south. As long as some Örms in the north
cannot earn export status, i.e. the trading partners are not too asymmetric, the model predicts
both countries experience an increase in inequality from globalization but the southís inequality
increases more. I also Önd that a bilateral symmetric decrease in trade costs decreases inequality
more in the south. However the north is better o§ maintaining lower tari§ than the south as
it generates relatively lower inequality than the symmetric reduction of tari§s for the north. A
symmetric decrease in Öxed cost to export has a similar e§ect as a bilateral symmetric tari§
reduction.
Chapter 3 decomposes the aggregate productivity growth for Chile using plant-level data
from 1979 to 1996. Chile got integrated into the world economy in early 70ís, during which most
of their businesses were denationalized as well. These features make Chile an interesting country
to study the productivity growth due to both inter-industry and intra-industry reallocation,
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thus combining elements of both neoclassical and new trade theories. I Önd that neither type of
reallocation played an important role in the productivity growth in Chile for this period. Instead
I Önd that technological progress contributed to the majority of this productivity growth.
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Chapter 1
Heterogenous Firms, Trade/FDI and
Inequality
1.1 Introduction
Often trade economists argue about the welfare gains from opening up to trade and ignore other
e§ects on the economy such as the e§ect on inequality. Most trade models predict a welfare
gain but at the expense of what? It is true that aggregate welfare is one of the most important
tools in the study of an economy, but social inequality plays an important role as well. Is it
possible to have welfare gain from open markets without creating any inequality or is inequality
inevitable? These are some questions trade economists are trying to address in the present
day.
To address the above questions this paper develops a theoretical model to study inequality
in a heterogenous Örms setup. These Örms share their proÖt with workers who are assumed
to be homogenous. In a Melitz environment globalization causes an expansion in production
by Örms that serve the foreign market and a contraction in production by Örms serving the
domestic market only. This expansion/contraction leads to increase/decrease of market share
for Örms and their employment. Hence total labor payment of Örms that have access to the
foreign market increases, since they are hiring more workers at the given wage rate. On the
other hand Örms serving only the domestic market decrease their total labor payment. This
causes a distortion in the economy leading to inequality.
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Think of an economy that has two channels to access the foreign market, trade and FDI,
similar to Helpman, Yeapel and Meltiz. Now let Örms share some of their rent as wage paid
to their workers, these workers who assumed to be homogenous in terms of their productivity.
Hence workers from a high productivity Örm will always earn a higher wage. Note that the
workers are not getting a higher wage because they are more productive, rather they may be
fortunate to be hired by a high productivity Örm. These workers have no choice over their
employer; which is a stringent assumption, but this isolates the fact that inequality is a conse-
quence from the redistribution mechanism of Melitz environment only. However any sorting in
the labor market, as in other models that deals with inequality in the Melitz framework, will
increase inequality. The economy described above gives a well-deÖned employment distribution
that can be used to construct the Lorenz curve to study the economy separately at three dif-
ferent states: (1) autarky, (2) trade equilibrium and (3) trade and FDI equilibrium. In the end
I conduct a thorough study on the e§ects of change in tari§ and Öxed cost in investment on
inequality.
The paper Önds that as countries open up for trade inequality increases; this further increases
as Örms get an additional channel to access foreign market via FDI. As countries open up
new channels to access foreign market, they increase competition that leads to reallocation of
resources (here labor) to more productive Örms. A Örm with higher productivity hires more
workers, pay higher wage since they earn higher proÖt. Hence any reallocation of resource leads
to an increase in the wage of workers coming from exiting and shrinking Örms. On the other
hand the wage of workers who stayed back with shrinking Örms remain the same, but their
total labor payment will go down with Örms market share. This leads to a higher inequality in
the economy.
I Önd that any decrease in tari§ or increase in Öxed cost in investment leads to lower
inequality even though it increases welfare. Any decrease in tari§ creates exporting opportunities
to some highly productive domestic and least productive investing Örms. The reallocation of
resource in this case goes from less productive domestic Örms to more productive exporters
and from more productive investors to less productive exporters. This causes an increase in the
concentration around the mean for the wage distribution, hence it decreases inequality. On the
contrary, an increase in Öxed cost to invest makes exporting market more proÖtable to some
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least productive investing Örms. As these Örms self select themselves as exporters labor gets
reallocated to less productive Örms as it decreases the level of competition in the market. This
mechanism expands the mass of exporters relative to investors and domestic producers only;
hence again, relatively more labor earn close to the mean wage of the economy that results in
lower inequality. However any situation that leads to higher competition in market causes the
welfare per worker to go up. This is a familiar dynamic in the Meltiz environment.
The paper also Önds that, access to better technology makes the local market relatively
more competitive. This forces some least productive Örms to exit the markets. On the other
hand their market share is occupied by expanding Örms. Note that, investors observe a higher
increase in market share relative to exporters and exporters observe a bigger market share than
domestic producers only. In this way a bigger portion of the population moves away from the
average wage of the economy and increases inequality in both economy. However, this still
improves aggregate welfare.
The literature about welfare gain from open markets started from Ricardo and continues
onto models of heterogenous Örms. This increase in welfare usually comes from increased com-
petition in the domestic market. As countries open up to foreign Örms they let high productivity
exporters and investors access their market. These high productivity Örms in turn lowers ag-
gregate price and pushes the least productive Örms out of the industry. This result was Örst
demonstrated by Melitz (2003), then by Helpman Melitz and Yeaple (2003), Demidova (2006)
and other extension of the Melitz model. In one way or another it is also possible to show that
a decrease in tari§ will increases welfare as well. This result holds as long as we have symmetric
countries; however, country asymmetry may lead to a decrease in welfare as shown by Demi-
dova (2006). A further examination of the welfare gain analysis is done by Melitz and Redding
(2013), where they compare the homogenous Örm setup to a heterogenous Örm setting. They
were able to show that by endogenous selection process, heterogenous Örms setting has this
additional channel to obtain aggregate welfare gain. However none of these studies looks at the
inequality aspect, hence this chapter considers inequality as well as welfare.
Recently some studies looked at the inequality aspect of globalization with heterogenous
Örms. These studies introduced labor market friction, which lead to higher inequality in the
economy from globalization. This kind of result is proved in Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) as
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well as in Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2008), Danziger (2014) and Pupato (2014). They
consider heterogenous workers, who had di§erent ability or marginal product of labor and/or
e§ort. The Örst paper from the list above took a measure of fair wage that has two parts in it,
one Örm-speciÖc and another industry-speciÖc. I drop the industry-speciÖc part and consider
only the Örm-speciÖc component of the wage deÖned by them. This opens up a Örmís rent-
sharing mechanism with a homogenous labor force. Labor is not mobile and they are employed
randomly over the pool of unemployed labor1. Since workers have no decision to make over
their employer, the Örms cannot sort workers. Egger and Kreickemeier predict within Örm
wage inequality, mine on the other hand creates inequality across Örms and industries. The
most of the other literature consider some sort of friction/imperfect labor market that induces
higher inequality form open markets. These studies consider setups more general than my
model since I do not have any labor market matching or sorting. However my speciÖcation
shows that globalization can create inequality from a very natural phenomena; the e¢cient
redistribution of resources in Melitz environment. A matching or sorting in the labor market
will only make inequality worse, hence globalization will always create some inequality in this
framework.
It is important to determine the role of rent in the determination of wage in labor economics.
Both theory and an extensive collection of empirical work Önds the existence of rent sharing
behavior by Örms. Essentially this means that larger Örms o§er higher wage. Wage can still
be a function of Örmsí productivity, however modeling wage from rents will exclude individual
characteristics of workers. This behavior is documented in many papers such as Budd and
Slaughter (2004), ChristoÖdes and Oswald (1992), Hildreth and Oswald (1997), Blancháower,
Oswald and Sanfey (1996), Budd, Konings and Slaughter (2005). For example, ChristoÖdes and
Oswald (1992) studied 600 labor contracts and found that Örmsí proÖt from the previous year
can e§ect current wage. They also estimated the proÖt elasticity of pay to be 0.006. Budd,
Konings and Slaughter (2005) tested if rents are shared across the border. They found it does
and the elasticity of wage to proÖt per worker is 0.03, which explains 20% of the observed
1Globalization can contract/expand market share for Örms, depending on how productive the Örm is. This
in turn creates some unemployment by contracting Örms and equal number of employment opportunity by
expanding Örms. Hence this model cannot generate unemployment. However, it is possible to imagine a protion
of the population remins unemployment. Hence it becomes exogenous in the model.
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variation in wage. The rent-sharing behavior of the Örm is one of the channels that generates
wage di§erential across Örms. Hence it is essential to explore this mechanism that leads to
inequality from open markets.
All these studies of inequality from globalization have considered wage as some function of
workers ability. But in theory we can see that wage can be some function of Örms rent as well.
A large Örm usually has higher productivity, hires more workers and pays higher wage. This
higher wage can come from either hiring high performing workers, higher rents or from both.
Considering homogenous workers will close down the channel through which a worker can e§ect
his or her wage. This creates a labor market with a wage proÖle instead of one single wage,
since workers cannot move across Örms and their employment will be Örms decision alone. In
this way workers are stopped from joining one Örm to create one symmetric wage. Hence the
paper shows that inequality is a very natural phenomenon in the Melitz environment. Sorting
or matching of labor in the labor market will only make the inequality worse. As a result,
opening up an economy will always create inequality.
The above studies of inequality from globalization only consider the trade equilibrium. What
happens from opening up new channels to access the foreign market in this setup? As far as I
know, this still remains an unexplored aspect of studying inequality from globalization. In the
general equilibrium set up, if Örms can access foreign market via FDI as well then inequality
will increase even more. In this paper I have shown that FDI will further reallocate the resource
to high productive Örms. This increases the wage proÖle for those who work for high productive
investors and lower the wage proÖle o§ered by shrinking exporters and domestic producers only.
Hence opening for FDI will further increase inequality in the economy.
1.2 Model
The model is based on Melitz (2003). There are two countries indexed by i and j with L
workers each. Workers are homogenous and have no choice to move across Örms. Each country
produces two types of goods: di§erentiated intermediate goods and homogenous Önal output.
Intermediary goods are traded in the open market, where as homogenous Önal output (not
traded in open market) is used to pay all of the sunk Öxed costs and consumption. Firms have
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access to foreign market via trade and FDI. In the following section I will give more speciÖc
description of the demand side.
1.2.1 Demand
The consumers consume the Önal output Y, which is an aggregate of intermediate goods. Their
preference of intermediate goods is given by the standard CES utility function and  > 1 is the
constant elasticity of substitution:
U = Y =
Z
2
q(i)
1
 di
 
1
1
 is the mass of available variety. Every individual has l = 1 endowment of labor that
they supply inelastically. They have no choice over wage, even though I assume homogenous
workers, hence they accept any wage that is o§ered by the Örm to them. As a result a Örm
with productivity  o§ers the following wage, w() =  for  2 (0; 1) where  is the Örms
productivity and  is the rent sharing parameter in this model.
The wage is usually, in standard labor theory, some function of workers ability and portion
of Örms rent (w = f(MPL; ability; l )). The homogenous workers assumption imply that they
all have same ability. In theory if that is the case workers will always move to a Örm that o§ers
the highest wage. In this way they will drive down the wage to one single level for all Örms.
However this is prohibited in this paper, simply because they do not have any choice when it
comes to employment. It is solely Örms decision to employ workers. It is possible to construct
a model where workers can make this sort of decision, this creates an imperfect labor market,
that leads to a higher inequality. The whole purpose of the model is to show that rent sharing
mechanism leads to income inequality with opening up to trade and investment, even though
they observe aggregate welfare gain. Note that,  = 0 imply Melitz model with unit wage and
I cannot consider  = 1 since this leads to a marginal cost of 1 for all Örm. Since price is a
constant markup over marginal cost, all Örms charge the same price which is their mark up:
Hence Örms share all rent with her workers and in the equilibrium all Örm make same proÖt.
Anything in between is a special case of Hartmut and Udoís paper, since I do not consider the
industry-speciÖc contributor to the wage. Under this condition an individual earns  and has
a demand for speciÖc variety as:
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q(i) = Rp(i)
P 1 (1.1)
P is the aggregate price index corresponding to the Önal output. I will normalize the aggre-
gate price index to be 1 and R =
R
2 r()d is the aggregate expenditure.
1.2.2 Production
Each Örm trying to enter the market undertakes a sunk Öxed cost of fe. Once they pay the
cost of fe, they get to draw their productivity from a distribution g(). After observing their
productivity a Örm can stay in the market and produce or exit. Firms going to production
pays another Öxed cost of f . All of the costs are paid in terms of the Önal output Y 2. Firms
compete in a monopolistically competitive market and require labor (l() = q()=) input to
produce intermediate goods. The price charged by the Örm in a monopolistically competitive
market is given by the following function:
p(i) =

  1
1
i (1.2)
1i is the marginal cost and

1 is the constant mark up from the CES utility. Note that
the limiting case of  = 1 leads to a marginal cost of 1. So the price charged by a Örm no longer
depends on the productivity and all Örms make same proÖt; hence we lose Örm heterogeneity
in equilibrium. Firms revenue is given by the following equation:
r(i) = R
"
i

  1

1
(1.3)
Revenue is an increasing function of Örmís productivity, and " is deÖned as (1 )(  1):
The proÖt of the Örm with observed  is given by the following equation:
(i) = r(i) l(i)i  f
=
r(i)

 f (1.4)
2Note that normalizing price index corresponding to the Önal output, will Öx the entree barrier at Öxed level.
This will be consistent with Meltiz literature.
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Since proÖt is increasing in its argument, the marginal Örm has productivity i such that
(i ) = 0: This identiÖes the producing Örms from exiting Örms and therefore the distribution
in equilibrium is given by (i) =
g(i)
1G(i ) for i 2 (

i ;1): The aggregate price is given by the
following equation:
P 1 = M
Z 1
i
p(i)
1 g(i)
1G(i )
di (1.5)
Where M is the mass of Örms active in a country, that is deÖned by the labor market
clearing condition L = M
R1
i
l(i)
g(i)
1G(i )di. This condition balances aggregate supply and
demand for labor and pins down the mass of active Örms to be:
Ma =
L
(  1)f
"
1

" Z 1
i
"i
g(i)
1G(i )
di
#1
(1.6)
Go to appendix for complete derivation. Note that the price index from equation (1.5) corre-
sponds to the homogenous Önal output, hence the price index represents CPI for the basket Y .
The aggregate productivity in this economy is then given by the following equation.
ei =
"Z 1
i
"i
g(i)
1G(i )
di
# 1
"
(1.7)
This is the productivity index observed by the consumers. This index considers all the
variety that is available to consumers. Hence the good can come from both foreign or domes-
tic producers. However consumers cannot access foreign goods since they are still in a closed
economy. Producers on the other hand face a di§erent index3.
fie =
"Z 1
i
"i
g(i)
1G(i )
di
# 1
"
(1.8)
Note that producers observe less average productivity, since a part of it goes to rent by the
rent sharing parameter . Contrasting to the previous productivity index, this index considers
only the mass of variety produced inside an economy. At autarky the mass of variety produced
3Since the relative employment compared to average Örm will be l()
l(e) = (e )", the avarage in the producer
index will be raised to " :
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and consumed inside an economy is same, since no foreign Örms can access the domestic market
of both countries4. These two indices jointly deÖne the average wage of the economy as E(w) =e"ie"ie 5: This can be obtained from wage distribution, that is discussed in the subsequent sections,
as well and these two methods give rise to same average wage.
In country i given any two observed value of the productivity (1 < 2) parameter I can
write the equations for relative output, revenue, price and wage by the following equations.
q(i2)
q(i1)
= (
i2
i1
)"+1 (1.9a)
r(i2)
r(i1)
= (
i2
i1
)" (1.9b)
w(i2)
w(i1)
= (
i2
i1
) (1.9c)
p(i2)
p(i1)
= (
i2
i1
)1 (1.9d)
l(i2)
l(i1)
= (
i2
i1
)" (1.9e)
so a Örm with higher productivity produces more output, earns a higher revenue, o§ers a
higher wage, employs relatively more workers and charges a lower price.
1.3 Equilibrium in Autarky
Firms draw their productivity i from a distribution g(i). Since only the Örms making positive
proÖt can stay in the market, Örms value function is then given by maxf0; (i) g. Here íí is
the external shock that a Örm has to exit in future6. Hence the free entry condition (FEC) will
be:
[1G(i)]
( ei)

= fe (1.10)
4This will not be the case at trade and FDI equlibrium, since now a mass of foreign Örms can compete in the
global market. This will be discussed in details in the following sections.
5Note that ei 6= R1 ()d: It will be the ratio of productivity index coming from consuption and
production.
6 In a steady state equlibrium, the mass of exiting Örms will be replaced by the mass of new entrees each
period.
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fe is the sunk Öxed cost to enter the market. This condition implies that Örms expected
future proÖt balance the Öxed cost to enter the market. After the prospective Örm pays the
cost fe it gets to draw the productivity parameter for the Örm íií from the PDF g(i): On the
other hand the Zero Cuto§ proÖt identiÖes average proÖt from the marginal Örm. Recall that
the proÖt function for a Örm with average productivity is given by,
( ei) = r( ei)  f
Note that the revenue of the average Örm can be expressed as the ratio of the cuto§ to
average productivity. The equation (1.9b) implies that r( ei) = f( eii )" . The zero cuto§ proÖt
(ZCP) is then given by the following equation:
( ei) = f
" ei
i
!"
 1
#
= fk(i ) (1.11)
where k(i) =
 ei
i
"
 1, Equation (1.10) and (1.11) jointly identify the domestic cuto§ i
by solving the following equilibrium condition.
[1G(i )]fk(i ) = fe (1.12)
LHS of the equation is the present discounted proÖt of the Örm upon drawing from the
CDF G(:): Let us deÖne j() = [1  G()]k(): For the rest of the paper I will consider
Pareto distribution, where g() = 
+1
8 > 1 and for  > ". This assumption implies that
j() = 1 [
"
" ]: So, j() is decreasing in itís argument as j
0() < 0 and we have a unique
solution from the system.
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1.3.1 Distribution of employment at Autarky
Claim 1 Given the active mass of Örms M , a Örm draws  from g() and employs l(). So
the distribution of employment will be:
e(i) =
M(i)l(i)
L 8 2 (i ;1) (1.13)
The Pareto assumption implies the equilibrium distribution to be Pareto as well,
(i) =


i
+1i
for i > 

i ; and employment distribution simpliÖes to:
e(i) =
1e"ie


i

++1"
i
8 2 (i ;1) (1.14)
The employment distribution takes the form of Pareto distribution with location parameter
being 

ie"ie and the shape parameter being  +  + 1  " ( See appendix for prove). Since we
have the equation for wage (w() = ), the wage distribution function can be obtained by
applying a random variable transformation technique. This distribution is then given by the
following expression.
yi(w) =
1e"e  

i w
"

1 8w 2 (i ;1) (1.15)
This is the wage weighted by the employment of the Örm of every observed . Note that
this still remains a Pareto distribution, but with di§erent shape and location parameter. (See
appendix)
The CDF and average wage can be constructed from the PDF of wage. Again by standard
statistical theory the CDF and average is given by íYi(w) = 1

w
1

i
"
í and íE(w) = eí.
These statistics help construct the Lorenz curve at autarky to be:
L(Yi) = 1 [1 Yi]
"
" (1.16)
The Lorenz curve Shows some level of inequality. However given Pareto distribution this
was expected. This is the base line level of inequality that I compare with inequality from other
state of the economy. (For details go to appendix)
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1.4 Trade economy
In this section countries open up for trade and Örms can engage in both domestic production and
exporting activity. I assume country symmetry, hence I can drop the country index. Exporting
Örms have to undertake two additional costs; a per unit cost of tari§  > 1 and a Öxed cost to
export to be fx, which is bigger than f1: Now the export price, revenue and proÖt will have
the following expression.
px(x) =  p() (1.17)
rx(x) = R
"

1
  1

P
1
= 1r(x) (1.18)
x(x) =
rx(x)

 fx = 
1r(x)

 fx (1.19)
Note that the market conditions are symmetric across countries, hence the aggregate price
index is same across countries and ri() = rj() for any two countries i and j. Again by the
property of the proÖt function I can Önd the cuto§ for exporter x such that x(

x) = 0:
This implies that 1r(x) = fx: The cuto§ for domestic and export market is tied by
x = 
[fxf 
1]
1
" : The consumers can now access foreign goods as these countries opened up
for trade. As a result the expression for average productivity from consumption goods is given
by, e"t = 1Mt [Me"d +MPx"e"x]7: This is a similar index deÖned by Melitz in his 2003 paper.
Note that, Px =
1G(x)
1G() is the probability of some one being an exporter given than it survives
the domestic competition. This productivity index considers both foreign and domestic goods,
since now Örms have exposure to foreign market.
1.4.1 Trade economy equilibrium
The FEC and ZCP together gives the following expression in trade economy:
f

j() +
fx

j(x) = fe (1.20)
7Here Mt = M(1+px) and the mass of Örms inside a country is determined by the market clearing condition.e"d and e"x are the average coming from domestic producers and exporters only respectively.
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The interpretation remains the same, however due to the additional term in LHS the domes-
tic cuto§ becomes higher. This happens due to the increased competition coming from foreign
market. More productive exporters enters the market with lower price and drives the less pro-
ductive domestic producers with higher price out from the market; a well known mechanism in
Meltiz literature.
Mass of Örms
The labor market clearing condition at trade has an additional term from employment of ex-
porters and is given by: L = M
R1
 l()
g()
1G()d + MPx
R1
x
lx()
g()
1G(x)d: By using the
similar analogy as before, the mass of Örms at trade economy is:
M =
L
  1
"
f
"
Z 1

"
g()
1G()d+
Px

fx
"x
Z 1
x

" g()
1G(x)
d
#1
(1.21)
Please refer to appendix for complete derivation. Note that the active mass of Örms from
a country is lower than autarky, but now countries have access to foreign market. So the total
number of Örms serving any market is Mt = M(1 + Px) > Ma =mass at autarky: Hence total
variety available to consumer increases.
1.4.2 Distribution of employment and Lorenz curve at trade economy
Employment distribution depends on aggregate productivity index faced by both consumers
and producers. Aggregate productivity index faced by consumers is similar to the productivity
index deÖned by Melitz (2003), but productivity index faced by producers considers the ag-
gregate productivity of all the output produced in a country for both domestic consumption
and exporting activities. This index can be expressed in two ways: a) consider the productivity
of all Örms producing for domestic market( 2 (d;1)) and exporters only( 2 (x;1)), b)
consider productivity of Örms producing for domestic market only ( 2 (d; x)) and the pro-
ductivity of Örms that serve both domestic and export market( 2 (x;1)). The second way
disaggregates the index in two groups, a) contribution coming from domestic producers only
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and b) contribution coming from Örms that both export and supply in domestic market. Hence
the productivity index using the latter method can be expressed as follows,
e"te = 1Mt [(1 Px)M

xed" + PxM(1 +  ")ex"] (1.22)
where

xed" = R xd " g()1G(d)d and ex" = R1x " g()1G(x)d. The Örst index
,

xed", refers to the Örms that serve only domestic market and the second index ,ex",
refers to the Örms that serve both domestic and export market. Note that the relative mass of
the Örms that are contributing to the productivity index is multiplied. However, the contribution
to aggregate productivity for exporters is discounted by the tari§ and/or transportation cost  ,
that is lost in transit; but the same mass PxM of Örms do not pay this tari§ while serving the
domestic market. Hence exporters e§ective productivity is di§erent, depending where they sell
their product. After I deÖne the aggregate productivity index in this manner, the employment
distribution can be derived from it as shown in equation (1.14).
e() =
 1e"te 1Px1+Px 

d

+1"+ 8 2 (d; x)
1e"te Px1+Px (1 +  ")


x

+1"+ 8 2 (x;1)
(1.23)
Proof. Note that
R x
d


d

+1" =

xed"and R1x x+1" = ex". Hence once we
integrate over the interval I get e(d <   1) = 1 and e0(:) < 0 , so this is our employment
distribution at trade:
The employment distribution in equation (1.23) has two parts, a) employment in Örms
that produce for domestic market only and b) employment in Örms that produce for both
export and domestic markets. Note that at the cuto§ point for exporters there is an increase in
employment, as they Önd additional demand in the foreign market. To satisfy this additional
demand exporters hire more workers, that are absorbed from the exiting domestic Örms and
existing domestic Örms that are shrinking. Trade does not e§ect the shape of wage equation, it
just shifts it to the right. By using the wage equation I can Önd the wage distribution in trade
economy as the following:
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y(wt) =
 1e"te 1Px1+Px  d w " 1t 8wt 2 (d ; x )
1e"te Px1+Px (1 +  ") 

x w
"

1
t 8wt 2 (

x ;1)
(1.24)
The steps to Önd this density is similar to the case of autarky. The only di§erence is that I
apply the transformation technique to distribution of employment in both sections separately.
Since exporters are serving two markets, they employs additional labor to produce some extra
units to serve foreign market. Hence the weighted payment to this segment of the workers is
higher even though the Örms o§er the same wage. This extra amount of labor is less e¢cient
since they face tari§. Together the density has a jump at 

x . This jump creates a distortion in
the labor market. Please refer to the Ögure 1.18:
FIGURE1.1 :"PDF of wage in trade and autarky"
Trade reallocates some workers from least paid exiting domestic Örms to high paying ex-
porting Örms. Note that the Örms who earn export status already has some employment for
domestic production, hence the new workers joining them earns same as old workers. This re-
allocation o§ers higher wage to only one segment of the population. This makes the tail of the
distribution fat relative to autarky. As a result, now more worker earn relatively more.
To Önd the Lorenz curve I need to know the CDF (Y (wt) that can be obtained by stan-
dard statistical method and the average wage E(wt). The expected wage is given by, E(wt) =R
wty(wt)dwt =
e"te"te = ete, that is discontinuous at the cuto§ for marginal Örm who earns
exporting status .
Claim 2 Given  and fx the Lorenz curve has the following expression from opening up for
trade:
L(Yt) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1
E(wt)
t11

1 1 Yt  t12 "" 8Yt 2 (0; Yt(x ))
L(Yt(

x )) +
1
E(wt)
t21

 
1

1 (Yt  Yt(x ))t22
 ""! 8Yt 2 (Yt(x ); 1) (1.25)
8The Ögure is generated by using the following values for the paremeter. L = 100;  = :5;  = 4;  = 5;
f = 3; fx = 5; fi = 11; fe = 2;  = :2;  = 1:3:
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Where, t11 =
1e"te 1Px1+Px "
"
d , 
t
12 =
ete
d
"
1+Px
1Px
+"
 , 
t
21 =
1e"te Px1+Px (1+ ") "
"
x
and t22 =
ete
x
"
1+Px
Px
1
1+"
+"
 . Note that the Lorenz curve has a kink at Yt(

x ) =
"
+"
t
11[1

x
d
"
]; this comes from the fact that the employment at the marginal Örm
observes a raise: Due to this kink I have two segments in the Lorenz Curve. Now the relative
wage of exporters is higher than domestic producer only.
Proposition 3 If wage is an increasing function (w = ) of Örms productivity with rent
sharing parameter of  2 (0; 1), Under Melitz environment opening up to trade increases wage
inequality.
Please refer to the Ögure 1.29:
FIGURE1.2:î lorenz curve at autarky and tradeî
The mass of Örms who can export suddenly Önds additional proÖt that can be earned by
exporting. To satisfy this additional demand of their goods in foreign market they hire some
workers, who used to work for exiting small Örms. These small Örms exit due to increased
competition. However the group of newly hired workers, who lost their jobs from exiting Örms,
earn same as some old workers hired by the same Örm with exporting capability. This distortion
increase the employment at the cuto§ for exporters and increases the weight at this cuto§ and
above. For example consider any  = x; then employment by this Örm jumps due to additional
production. This leads to a higher average wage at open market. The average wage of exporters
increase more than the average wage of domestic producer. This distortion in the average
wage across sectors (domestic and export market producers) leads to higher inequality for both
trading countries10.
9An additional simulation of Gini at autarky and trade conÖrms that Ga = 0:1099 < Gt = 0:1157 , where
they are Gini at autarky and trade respectively.
The model parameters for simulation will be discussed later.
10This result aligns with the existing literature that studies the link between inequality and globalization. For
example, Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) as well as in Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2008), Danziger (2014)
and Pupato (2014)
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1.5 FDI economy
Firms investing in foreign market have to under take an additional sunk Öxed cost of fI >
fx
1 > f > fe (An assumption to separate investors from exporters): However since I con-
sider horizontal FDI with proximity concentration, now goods will not have to bear transporta-
tion cost. With proximity concentration Örms invest only when the proÖt from investing more
then compensates from avoiding transportation cost to serve foreign market. Note that the
symmetry assumption implies similar demand condition across countries. This essentially im-
plies that the price asked by investors in foreign market is same as their domestic competitors
with same level of productivity. Given this I can Önd the expression for price, revenue and proÖt
by the following expressions:
pI(I) = p(I) (1.26)
rI(I) = r(I) (1.27)
I(I) =
r(I)

 fI (1.28)
Since I used the proximity concentration, the cuto§ for investors is pined down where the
di§erence in proÖt for investors to exporters is zero; by the expression I(I)  x(I) = 0:
This implies that (1  1)r(I) = (fI  fx) and the FDI and domestic cuto§s are tied by,
I = 

h
fIfx
f
1
11
i 1
"
: The aggregate productivity index faced by consumers now has three
terms, along with their relative mass in the economy.
e"tI = 1MI [M

x0ed0" +M(Px0  PI)" Iex0" +MPIe"I ] (1.29)
A point to note here is that the mass of foreign Örms do not increase due to this additional
channel as these investors were exporters before they had access to this channel of FDI. Hence
the total variety available to consumer now is MI = (1 + Px0)M: Firms probability of being an
exporter depending on if it survives the domestic competition or not has a similar expression
as before; however, now the domestic and export cuto§ is higher due to increased competition
and the expression uses the new cuto§s described in FDI economy.
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1.5.1 Equilibrium in FDI economy
Once the Örms decision is characterized I can combine the FEC and ZCP together to have the
following expression of equilibrium with both trade and FDI:
f

j(d0) +
fx

j(x0) +
fI  fx

j(I) = fe (1.30)
Note that, now I have an additional term on top of trade economy equilibrium. This implies
higher competition in domestic market. This increased competition applies the reallocation of
resources to higher productive Örms and push out the least productive Örms out of business.
High productive investors charge a lower price relative to exporters and domestic producers in
a country. Once they enter the market least productive domestic Örm cannot compete since
they charge a higher price. This drives them out of the market and foreign competitors expand
their market share by occupying this excess demand.
Mass of Örms
The labor market clearing condition in FDI economy has an addition term as it will employ
some additional workers for investing Örms and is given by: L = M
R1
 l()
g()
1G()d+M(Px
PI)
R1
x
lx()
g()
1G(x)di+MPI
R1
I
[lI() lx()] g()1G(I )d. The mass of Örms that survive the
increased competition due to FDI gets lower than trade equilibrium and is given by,
M =
L
  1
24 f" R1 " g()1G()d+ PxPI fx"x R Ix " g()1G(x)d
+PI(1 )fIfx"I
R1
I

" g()
1G(I )d
351 (1.31)
Please refer to the appendix for detail derivation. However the total variety available is
MI = M(1+Px0) andMI 7Mt > Ma =mass of Örms active in autarky. Note that PI = 1G(

I )
1G()
is the conditional probability of some one being an investor given that it survives the domestic
market competition.
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1.5.2 Employment distribution at FDI economy
Again we need to deÖne the aggregate productivity index such that, we have contribution
coming from three di§erent sources: such as a) Örms producing for domestic market only, b)
Örms producing for both domestic and export market, c) Örms producing for both domestic
and FDI market. Hence the index will be :
e"tIe = 1MI [M(1Px0)

x0ed0"+M(Px0 PI)(1+  ")Iex0"+2PIM eI" ] (1.32)
Note that here

x0ed0" = R x0
d0

" g()
1G(
d0 )
d,

Iex0" = R I
x0

" g()
1G(
x0 )
d andeI" = R1I " g()1G(I )d11: The mass of active Örms in this economy is lower than trade
economy, and the three indices are the aggregate productivity index of domestic Örms only,
exporters and domestic Örms only and the last one is for investors and domestic Örms only.
After deÖning the appropriate averages, the employment distribution can be derived using
similar steps as trade economy.
e() =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1e"tIe
1Px0
1+Px0


d0

+1(") 8 2 (d0 ; x0)
1e"tIe
Px0PI
1+Px0
(1 +  ") 

x0

+1(") 8 2 (x0 ; I)
1e"tIe 2PI1+Px0


I

+1(") 8 2 (I ;1)
(1.33)
Note that the mass of Örms working as investors are smaller than mass of domestic producers
only. On the other hand, the mass of exporters can be smaller or bigger to mass of investors
depending on the parameter values. For example, if tari§ is low enough then the mass of
exporters is higher. However this small mass of investors employ relatively higher number of
workers compare to exporters, and exporters employ relatively more workers than domestic
producer only. Both exporters and investors observe an increase in the employment, using
similar mechanism for trade economy. These jumps are coming from the fact that they face
additional demand other than domestic demand from foreign market. Exporters face higher
11Note that d0 and 

x0 re§ers to domestic and export cuto§ with FDI in the economy.
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marginal cost due to tari§ and investors avoid this per unit cost but have to undertake a higher
Öxed cost to invest. This decreases the contribution of productivity of worker (marginal product
of labor), who works for Örms with exporting status, hence the jump for exporters is less than
investors. Note that investors do not have such productivity loss from serving foreign market,
since they set up new plants in foreign market and avoid paying tari§  .
Following the same steps as before, the wage distribution at trade economy can be con-
structed from the employment distribution. Now to obtain the PDF, I apply the Jacobian
transformation to three di§erent parts of the employment distribution separately. The wage
equation again shifts to the right due to increased competition in the market. After the calcu-
lation the wage distribution takes the following expression:
y(wtI)
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(1.34)
Please refer to the Ögure 1.312:
FIGURE1.3:îPDF of wage at autarky trade and FDIî
The Ögure shows that the wage distribution has two jumps for the marginal Örms for ex-
porters and investors. Some highly productive exporters are able to invest in the foreign market.
This creates additional demand for these new investorís goods in the foreign market since they
charge lower price than before. To satisfy this demand investors shrink the export and domestic
market by increasing competition. The increased competition forces some Örms to exit and the
surviving Örms to contract. This in turn releases some workers from their previous employer
and reallocates them to some highly paid investors. Similar kind of result is revealed from the
lorenz curve as well.
To Önd the Lorenz curve I need to know the CDF (Y (wtI)) and the average wage E(wtI) .
The CDF can be obtained by standard statistical theory and the expression for Expected wage
at FDI economy is E(wtI) is derived from the weighted wage distribution as well: The average
wage has contribution coming from three parts; (1)domestic producers only, (2) exporters and
12 I cannot consider  > 1:3 since this will lead to export cuto§ being higher than FDI cuto§ given fI = 11:
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domestic market producers and (3) investors and domestic market producers. As countries
open new channels to access the foreign market the average wage increases. Now investors
employ more workers since their foreign market activity is more e¢cient. This leads to a higher
employment above the cuto§ for investment ( = I). The exporting sector and domestic
sector shrinks in terms of employment. In the process the average wage of investment sector
increases more than the average of exporting and domestic sector.
Claim 4 Given  , fx and fI the Lorenz curve has the following expression from to opening
up for trade and investment:
L(YtI) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
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Note that the Lorenz curve has two kinks at investment economy: the First one is at exporters
cuto§, YtI(

x0 ) = (
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]: These kinks are
there due to the distortion created in the economy by opening up to foreign market.
Proposition 5 If wage is an increasing function (w = ) of Örms productivity with rent
sharing parameter of  2 (0; 1), Under Melitz environment opening up to trade and FDI further
increases wage inequality.
The mass of Örms who can invest suddenly Önds investing in a foreign market is more
proÖtable than exporting. Moreover the e§ective productivity of workers are now no longer
be less due to no tari§ in place, hence these new investing Örms can ask for a lower price
compared to what they used to ask as exporters. This e§ect creates additional demand for
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their output. To satisfy this additional demand of their good in foreign market they hire some
workers. These workers come from exiting and contracting Örms from domestic market and
export market. Increased competition increases the cuto§ for domestic market and investors
increases competition in foreign market for exporters, hence some least productive exporters
exits the export market and start producing for domestic market. Now these two groups of
people are hired by the investors to satisfy their extra demand in the foreign market. Additional
to the jump of employment for all exporters there is another jump in the level of employment
in the investors as well. However this newly hired workers by investors earn higher wage than
before (when their Örm was exporter). This causes an additional distortion in the average wage
of the economy, that leads to increase in social inequality. Please refer to the Ögure 1.413:
FIGURE1.4:îLorenz curve at autarky, trade and FDI"
1.6 Comparative static analysis
This section studies two aspects of globalization: a symmetric bilateral tari§ reduction by
trading partners and a symmetric decrease in Öxed cost to invest. This analysis is conducted
using computer simulations 14. The model parameters for these task are given below;
L=100, =.4, =3.8, =3.3,f=3, fx=5.5,fI=12, fe=2, =.2, =1.15 and l=1. Note that 
and fI will take di§erent values for comparative static analysis.
1.6.1 Trade liberalization "decrease in tari§"
For this exercise I solve the entire model with two level of tari§s, a)  = 1:1 and b) = 1:2:
Please go to Ögure 1.5 and 1.6.
FIGURE1.5:"E§ect of change in tari§ to domestic cuto§"
FIGURE1.6:"E§ect of change in tari§ to export and FDI cuto§"
Given the parameter values if tari§ goes above 1.32, domestic cuto§ starts to rise. This
violates the assumptions related to the Öxed costs in three di§erent states of the economy.
13The Gini at FDI was simulated as well for comparison. GI = 0:1821 > Gt = 0:1157 > Ga = 0:1099:
14The parameter values that I assumed during the simulation is taken from Demidova (2006) and Helpman,
Yeaple and Melitz (2004) paper.
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Hence Ögure 1.5 plots tari§ from 1.1 to 1.32 and from Ögure 1.6, it is understood that above
1.32 of tari§ I am no longer able to separate exporters from investors. Hence for this section,
the analysis takes place in the tolerable range.
A decrease in tari§ has two opposing e§ects on the domestic market competition: a) some
highly productive domestic producers have additional proÖt opportunity from exporting and
b) some low productive investors Önd exporting is proÖtable than investing. The Örst e§ect
increases competition in domestic market and pushes up the cuto§, where as the second e§ect
decreases competition in foreign market for exporters and increases the FDI cuto§. This ad-
ditional exporters further increase competition that leads to higher domestic cuto§ for both
countries. These entree and exit governs the direction of inequality created by trade liberaliza-
tion. The mass of Örms in domestic market decreases, mass of exporters increases and Önally
the mass of investors decreases. People leaving from least productive exiting Örms (both from
domestic and investment market) decreases inequality and people joining to high productive
Örms increases inequality. It turns out that due to this the inequality goes down, hence the Örst
e§ect dominates. The simulation generates the PDF of wage at FDI economy for two levels of
tari§. Please refer to the Ögure 1.7.
FIGURE1.7:"E§ect of change in tari§ to PDF of wage at FDI economy "
From the Ögure, decrease in tari§ increases the income of workers going from domestic
exiting Örms to exporting Örms and decreases income of workers going from exiting investing
Örms to exporting Örms. Workers coming from exiting domestic and investing Örms decrease
inequality. In this process the majority of the population who got displaced from the center
of the distribution due to higher tari§ goes back to the center. As a result the Lorenz curve
displays a decrease in wage inequality. Please refer to the Ögure 1.8:
FIGURE1.8:î E§ect of change in tari§ to lorenz curve of FDIî
1.6.2 A decrease in Öxed cost to invest fI
Following same kind of idea, I took two di§erent levels of fI and solve the entire model. The
Öxed cost fI varies between 11 and 16. However in this case there is a lower bound to Öxed cost
that is applicable. Below that level I cannot separate the investors from exporters. Please refer
to Ögure 1.9 and 1.10.
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Figure1.9: "E§ect of change in Öxed cost to invest to domestic cuto§ "
Figure1.10: "E§ect of change in Öxed cost to invest to export and FDI cuto§ "
Figure 1.10 conÖrms that as Öxed cost to invest gets smaller the cuto§ for investment gets
smaller. However the export cuto§ is una§ected by this change, hence There is a point (fI < 7:2)
below that I cannot separate exporters from investors. The rest of the analysis takes place in
tolerable range for the model.
The decrease in Öxed cost to invest has two opposing e§ects like before: a) open up new
investment opportunity for some highly productive exporters, hence increase the competition in
foreign market and b) increased competition in foreign market pushes some exporters out of the
market, hence decrease competition in foreign market. However the simulation result conÖrms
that the Örst e§ect dominates and leads to an increase in domestic cuto§ for both countries.
The change in mass of domestic Örms is ambiguous, where as the mass of exporters decrease
and mass of investors increase. Please refer to the Ögure 1.11:
FIGURE1.11: "E§ect of change in Öxed cost to invest to PDF of wage at FDI economy"
As the transition takes, place more workers from less paid jobs lose their jobs for high paid
jobs in investing Örms. This e§ect increases inequality, on the other hand people losing jobs
from least productive exiting domestic Örms decrease inequality. The Örst e§ect dominates in
this case and majority of the population moves away from the average wage of the economy.
Please refer to the Ögure 1.12:
FIGURE:1.12"E§ect of change in Öxed cost to invest to Lorenz curve at FDI"
1.6.3 The e§ect of Technological Improvement
Technological improvement in this set up with Pareto distribution implies a decrease in the
shape parameter of Pareto distribution15. As technology improves the local market of both
economies become more competitive. This puts some of the least productive domestic Örms out
of the economy and increases the market share of all existing Örms. However, investors market
share increases the most, followed by exporters and lastly surviving domestic Örms only. Please
refer to Ögure 1.13:
15The shape parameter, , varies from 3.3 to 3.1.
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FIGURE:1.13"PDF of wage and technological progress"
As countries get access to better technology, investors increase their average wage relatively
more than exporters and exporters average increase relatively more than the entire economy. In
this manner the majority of the population move away from the average wage and the countries
observe a higher inequality. Please refer to Ögure 1.14:
FIGURE:1.14"Lorenz Curve and technological progress"
However, there seems to be two opposing e§ect working from this change. Some least
productive domestic Örms release some workers, which decreases inequality. On the other
hand, when they are hired by high productive exporters and investors that increases inequality.
The simulation suggests that the second e§ect dominates and from the transition both countries
observe an increase in the level of inequality.
1.6.4 The e§ect of rent-sharing on inequality
Rent sharing () varies from 0.1 to 0.9. Given the parameter values of the model, the equilibrium
condition breaks down out side of this range. For this section, I will let this parameter to vary
in the tolerable range.  has two di§erent e§ects on inequality: for relatively low  inequality
rises and for high  it decreases. Please refer to Ögure 1.15.
Figure:1.15"Inequality and rent sharing"
Note that from 0.1 to 0.5 inequality increases then it decreases up to 0.8 and then it is not
that responsive from 0.8 to 0.9. The interpretation of the Örst interval (0.1-0.5) is trivial, as it
o§ers higher wage to workers and by this workers from high productive Örms earn higher wage.
As a result, the inequality increases. However, after 0.5 Örms share majority of their proÖt
as rent. This lower their proÖt and they can no longer compete in the export and investment
market. As these foreign Örms decrease their activity in other country, they decrease their
market share. This market is occupied by the domestic producers only. Hence workers lose jobs
from high productive exporters and investors and hired by lo productive domestic producers
only. In this way for high rents inequality starts to fall. This e§ect starts to slow down after
0.8 and any further increase in  does not change inequality.
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1.6.5 Welfare analysis
The aggregate welfare per worker has the following expression:
W
L
= E(w) (1.36)
Since aggregate price index is normalized to one the welfare only depend on the average
wage of the economy. Note that an increased competition due to opening of market for trade and
FDI increases the cuto§ for domestic market. As the cuto§ increases the minimum productivity
require to serve the domestic market increases. This results in higher wage and higher welfare
per worker.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper develops a model to study wage inequality created by opening up to foreign com-
petitors in a heterogenous Örms setup. It shows that as countries open more channels to access
foreign market they observe an increase in welfare and wage inequality. No sorting/matching in
the labor market is not a very realistic assumption but at least in theory we have this room to
experiment with some extreme environments that indicates inequality is unavoidable. It shows
that inequality is a very natural phenomenon created by trade and FDI. Under sorting/matching
inequality will be higher than no sorting/matching, since it adds more sources to increase the
inequality. Workers displacement from the autarky equilibrium redistributes population in such
a way to increase welfare that, it results in creating some wage inequality. As more productive
exporters and investors come to compete, least productive domestic producers exit the market.
Hence these workers from exiting Örms start earning high wage as workers from exporting and
investing Örms. The displacement of these workers generates wage inequality very naturally
due to trade and FDI.
The paper also studies the impact of decrease in Öxed cost to invest and tari§ on employment
and wage inequality. They have opposite e§ect on wage inequality; as a decrease in tari§
redistributes the worker back to the center of the distribution and a decrease in Öxed cost to
invest puts them back at the tail of the distribution. A decrease in tari§ decrease inequality, on
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the other hand a decrease in Öxed cost to invest has the opposite e§ect. Lastly, an access to
better technology increases the inequality along with the aggregate welfare.
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Chapter 2
Heterogenous Firms, Trade and
Inequality across Asymmetric
Countries
2.1 Introduction
These days trade economists are trying to understand the link between globalization and in-
equality. A variety of theoretical model in trade literature shows that globalization will increase
the aggregate welfare of an economy. But if globalization causes inequality as well, then it is
important to address how inequality is raised structurally from opening up an economy. The
theoretical literature of this topic considers trade between symmetric countries and the e§ect it
has on inequality. However the question still remains open, when it comes to globalization and
inequality across asymmetric countries. What happens to inequality and welfare if the average
productivity of active Örms across country is di§erent? Which direction does the inequality go
for these countries and who wins or loses?
To answer these questions, imagine two economies with heterogenous Örms and monopolisti-
cally competitive output market. These Örms share their proÖt with workers. However, Örms in
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north exhibits a higher average productivity relative to south1. These workers are homogenous
in terms of their productivity. Hence workers from a high productivity Örm earn a higher wage,
simply because they work in a bigger and more productive Örm. Workers have no choice over
their employer, as a result it generates a wage proÖle instead of one single wage. This proÖle
along with the employment distribution leads to the Lorenz curve of the economy at di§erent
states, such as autarky and trade. Country asymmetry opens up the door to study the economy
across north and south as well. At the end I conducted a thorough study of the e§ects changes
in tari§ and Öxed cost on exports and inequality.
The paper considers a labor market with no sorting mechanism, where the Örms share rents.
This behavior is well documented in the labor economics literature. For example, Budd and
Slaughter in their 2004 paper considered 1,014 Canadian manufacturing Örm-union contract.
They found that American industry proÖtability can e§ect the Canadian wage outcome and
there seems to be international rent sharing across borders. ChristoÖdes and Oswald in their
1992 paper studied 600 labor contracts from Canadian economy between 1978 and 1984. They
found that wages are an increasing function of employers past proÖts. They also estimate the
proÖt elasticity of pay to be 0.006 from the data. Also, Hildreth and Oswald (1997) estimated
the long run elasticity of wage with respect to proÖt per worker to be slightly below 0.02.
Blancháower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996), Budd and Slaughter (2005) also Önd supporting evi-
dence that rent share takes place. The rent sharing behavior of the Örm is one of the channels
that generates wage di§erentials across Örms. Hence it is essential to explore this mechanism
that leads to inequality from open market.
The paper Önds that the inequality is higher in the north in autarky. South has less high
productive Örms relative to north in autarky. Hence the market share of more productive Örms
is bigger in north, since they make their local market more competitive. As a result, these high
productive Örms in north have a higher labor payment. At the same time, local market in north
is more competitive relatively to south. So on an average the aggregate productivity is higher,
since the least productive Örms have to have a higher productivity to survive in north. Since
wage is Örmsí rent only, Örms from north pay higher wage to more workers relative to south.
All of these together leads to a higher inequality in north at autarky.
1This setup is similar to Demidova (2008) asymmetirc country model.
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The paper also Önds that a shift from autarky to trade equilibrium increases inequality
relatively more in south than north. As countries open up to trade, their is increased competition
that leads to reallocation of the resources (labor) to more productive Örms. A Örm with high
productivity hires more workers, pays higher wage since they earn higher proÖt. Hence any
reallocation of resources leads to an increase in the wage of workers coming from exiting and
shrinking Örms. At the same time wage of workers who stayed back with shrinking Örms remains
the same, but their total labor payment goes down with Örmsí market share. This leads to higher
inequality for both countries.
The above e§ect is applicable for both countries, however south is relatively more a§ected
by the redistribution. Globalization opens up exporting opportunities to more Örms in north
relative to the south. As a result the market share of these Örms in north grows even bigger
than southís high productive Örms. This in turn redistributes more workers to high productive
Örms in north. In this process the majority of the population works for Örms that has bigger
market share in north. But in south relatively more workers stay back with the Örms that has
both less productivity and smaller market share. Hence south observes higher inequality from
globalization relative to north.
Lastly, the paper Önds that a symmetric decrease in tari§ or Öxed cost to export leads to
a lower inequality and higher welfare. These changes create exporting opportunities to some
highly productive domestic Örms for both countries. The reallocation of resources in this case
goes from less productive domestic Örms to more productive exporters. Hence this creates a
situation where larger share of workers have higher wage. This in turn decreases the inequality
from the transition, since now exporters go thorough an expansion. It leads to a higher wage
for workers from exiting and shrinking Örms, since their new employers expand and earn more
proÖt and in the end share more rent. The paper also studies the e§ect of unilateral tari§
reduction by the south. The direction of change in inequality remains the same in this case
however, it reveals that north can observe a lowest possible inequality by imposing lower tari§
relative to itís less productive trading partner.
The paper compares and contrasts the result of inequality with welfare analysis. The welfare
e§ect of the model agrees with the existing literature of heterogenous Örms. The literature about
welfare gain from trade started from Ricardo and continued to Melitz and extensions of his work
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on heterogenous Örms. This increase in welfare usually comes from increased competition in
the domestic market with a heterogenous Örms setup. As countries open up to foreign Örms
they let high productive exporters access their market. This high productive market in turn
lowers aggregate price and pushes the least productive Örms out of the industry. This result
was demonstrated Örst by Melitz (2003), then by Helpman Melitz and Yeaple (2003), Demidova
(2008) and other extensions of Melitz. It is also possible to show that as countries decrease
tari§ this welfare increases even more. This result is well known as long as we have symmetric
countries. However country asymmetry may lead to a decrease in welfare, as shown by Demidova
(2008), if trading countries are too asymmetric. A further examination of the welfare gain
analysis is done by Melitz and Redding (2013), where they compare the homogenous Örm setup
to a heterogenous Örm setting. They were able to show that by endogenous selection process,
heterogenous Örms setting has this additional channel to obtain aggregate welfare gain. This
chapter contrasts the result of welfare gain at di§erent state to inequality at di§erent state.
To introduce country asymmetry this paper builds on Demidovaís 2008 paper. Here a Örm
trying to enter the market in a north has a better chance of observing a higher productivity
compared to a Örm in south. This asymmetry induces in a di§erent level of competition across
countries. She found that if trading countries are not too asymmetric then they both go through
a welfare improvement. However if they are too asymmetric then south can observe a decrease
in welfare from opening up for trade. Her paper o§ers some interesting insight of trade with
country asymmetry, but does not talk about inequality. The reallocation of resources in this
economy is similar to the case of Melitz (2003). The reallocation of resources along with a
mechanism to share proÖt of Örms with their workers creates a labor market with no matching
or sorting to study inequality. Similar to Demidovaís model, I also consider countries that are
not too asymmetric. Too much asymmetry results in a situation where all the existing Örms in
the north start to export2. As long as country asymmetry is in a tolerable range, both countries
go through an increase in welfare and north can beneÖt more when I considered inequality.
Aside from the extensive research on welfare and globalization under Örm heterogeneity,
some papers have considered the inequality aspect of globalization. These studies used het-
2Allowing for this jeopardizes the existence of the model equlibrium.
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erogenous Örms environment with some labor matching mechanism to study inequality. These
market sorting in turn generates inequality in the economy. This kind of result is proved in
Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) as well as in Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2008), Danziger
(2014) and Pupato (2014). They consider heterogenous workers, who had di§erent ability or
marginal product of labor and/or e§ort. The paper by Egger and Kreickemeier took a measure
of fair wage that has two parts in it: Örm speciÖc and industry speciÖc. This paper considers
only the Örm speciÖc part of wage, since this will close down the sorting of labor in the market.
At the same time workers have no choice over their wage that results in a labor market with
no sorting or matching mechanism. The paper by Egger and Kreickemeier listed above found
inequality increased within the Örm due to globalization, this research on the other hand Önds
globalization creates inequality across Örms and industries. The rest has some sort of friction
that results in higher inequality form open market as well. These studies are in a more general
setup than in my model since I do not have any labor market sorting or matching mechanism.
However this speciÖcation shows that globalization can create inequality from a very natural
phenomena, such as the e¢cient redistribution of resources in Melitz environment. Sorting or
matching in labor market will only make inequality worse, hence globalization will always create
some inequality in asymmetric country setup as well.
All of the studies about inequality listed above have considered wage as some function
of workers ability or e§ort. But, in theory wage can be some function of Örmís rent as well.
This mechanism is considered across symmetric countries in Akbar (2014) with FDI and trade.
A large Örm usually has higher productivity, hires more workers and pays higher wage. This
higher wage can come from either hiring high performing workers and higher rents or from
both. Considering homogenous workers close down the channel through which a worker can
e§ect his wage. This creates a labor market with a wage proÖle instead of one single wage;
since these workers cannot move across Örms and their employment is Örmsí decision alone.
In this way workers are prohibited from going to one single Örm and in equilibrium end up
creating symmetric wage. Hence the paper shows that inequality is a very natural phenomenon
in heterogenous Örm setup. Sorting/matching in the labor market only make it worse. As a
result opening up an economy always creates inequality.
Also these studies of inequality consider a symmetric country setup only. As a result some
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interesting dynamics of inequality is lost from the discussion. Allowing for country asymmetry
(such as Demidova (2008)) shows, the direction inequality goes across countries as they open
up for trade. It helps to understand the di§erence between mechanism across asymmetric coun-
tries that leads to higher inequality. I Önd that globalization increases inequality, but north will
observe higher increase in inequality compared to north. But both of the trading partners ob-
serve welfare improvement. I also Önd that trade liberalization reduces inequality but increases
welfare.
2.2 The Model
The model is based on Demidova (2008). There are two countries indexed by i and j with L
workers each. Workers are homogenous and have no choice to move across Örms. Each country
produces two types of goods: di§erentiated intermediate goods and homogenous Önal output.
Intermediary goods are traded in the open market, but homogenous Önal output (not traded
in open market) is used to pay all of the sunk Öxed costs and consumption.
2.2.1 Demand side
The consumers consume the Önal output Y that uses intermediate goods as inputs. Their
preference is given by the standard CES utility function and  > 1 is the constant elasticity of
substitution:
Ui = Yi =
"Z
i2i
qi(i)
1
 di
# 
1
(2.1)
i pins down the mass of available variety. Every individual has l endowment of labor that
they supply inelastically. Workers have no choice over wage, even though they are homogenous,
and they accept any wage that is o§ered by the Örm to them. As a result, the economy generates
the following wage given the productivity of the Örm is i,
wi(i) = 

i  2 (0; 1) (2.2)
Where,  is the rent sharing parameter in this model. The wage is usually, in standard labor
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theory, some function of marginal product of labor and portion of Örms rent (w = f(MPL; l )).
The homogenous workers assumption implies that they all have same ability. In theory if that
is the case workers always move to a Örm that o§ers the highest wage. In this way they drive
down the wage to one single level for all Örms.
However this does not happen in this model, simply because they do not have any choice
when it comes to employment. It is solely Örms decision to employ workers. It is possible to
construct a model where workers can make this sort of decisions, this only creates a sorting in
the labor market, that leads to a higher inequality. The whole purpose of the model is to show
that rent sharing mechanism leads to income inequality with opening up to trade, even though
countries observe aggregate welfare gain. Note that  = 0; imply unit wage like Melitz (2003)
and I cannot consider  = 1 since this leads to a marginal cost of 1 for all Örms3. Since price
is a constant markup over marginal cost, all Örms charge the same price if  = 1; which is their
mark up: Hence Örms share all rent with her workers. Anything in between leads to a special
case of Hartmut and Udoís paper, since I do not consider the industry speciÖc contributor to
the wage. Under this condition an individual earns l and has a demand for speciÖc variety to
be:
qi(i) = Ripi(i)
P 1i (2.3)
Pi is the aggregate price index corresponding to the Önal output. This index is normalized
to one and Ri =
R
i2 ri(i)di is the aggregate expenditure. Note that, I cannot normalize
the price index in both countries since the aggregate price index is not same across countries.
2.2.2 Supply side
Each Örm trying to enter the market have to undertake a sunk cost. Once they pay the sunk cost
of fe, they draw their productivity from a distribution gi(i). After observing their productivity
a Örm can either stay in the market and produce or exit. Firms going to production pays another
Öxed cost of f . All of the costs are paid in terms of the Önal output Yi. Firms compete in a
monopolistically competitive market and require labor ( li(i) = qi(i)=i) input to produce
3Marginal cost will come from Örmís problem. This will be discused in the áowing section.
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intermediate goods. The price charged by the Örm is given by the following function that arises
from equalizing marginal beneÖt and marginal cost of the monopolist:
pi(i) =

  1
1
i (2.4)
1i is the marginal cost and

1 is the constant mark up from the CES utility. Note that
when  = 1; marginal cost becomes 1. So the price charged by a Örm no longer depends on
the productivity and in equilibrium Örm heterogeneity is lost. Firms revenue is given by the
following equation,
ri(i) = Ri
"
i

  1

1
(2.5)
Here, " = (1  )(  1): The proÖt of the Örm with observed i is given by the following
equation:
i(i) = ri(i) li(i)i  f
=
ri(i)

 f (2.6)
Since proÖt is increasing in its argument, there exists i such that i(

i ) = 0: This identi-
Öes producing Örms to exiting Örms and therefore, the distribution in equilibrium is given by
i(i) =
gi(i)
1Gi(i ) for i 2 (

i ;1): The aggregate price index in an economy is then given by:
P 1i = Mi
Z 1
i
pi(i)
1 gi(i)
1Gi(i )
di (2.7)
where, Mi is the mass of Örms active in country i. The mass of Örms active in this economy
comes from the labor market clearing condition, that is L = Mia
R1
 li(i)
gi(i)
1Gi(i)di. This
condition equalizes aggregate demand and supply of labor. Hence the mass of Örm in this
economy is given by the following expression4.
Mia =
L
(  1)f
"
1
i
" Z 1
i
"i
g(i)
1G(i )
di
#1
(2.8)
4The mass calcualtion in this model is similar to Akbar (2014).
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Note that the price index from equation (2.7) deÖned above is the price of homogenous Önal
output. The aggregate productivity is,
ei =
"Z 1
i
"i
gi(i)
1Gi(i )
di
# 1
"
(2.9)
This productivity index is observed by the consumers. Another way to look at it as the
average productivity used to produce all available variety to consumers in a country. These
supply of goods can come from both domestic and foreign producers. However, producers on
the other hand face a di§erent index5.
e
ie
=
"Z 1
i
"i
gi(i)
1Gi(i )
di
# 1
"
(2.10)
Note that producers observe less average productivity, since a part of it goes to rent. This
productivity index takes an average over all variety produced by Örms inside a country. So same
goods lead to di§erent measure of productivity for producers and consumers. At autarky the
available variety consumed and produced is same, but this is not the case at trade equilibrium.
This will be discussed in details in following section for trade equilibrium. These two indices
jointly deÖne the average wage of the economy as eie = e"ie"ie 6:
In a country i given any two observed value of the productivity (i1 < i2) parameter the
5Since the relative employment compared to average Örm is l()
l(e) = (e )". The avarage in the producer
index will be raised to " : This will simply the calculation.
6Note that ei 6= R1 ()d: It will be the ratio of productivity index coming from consuption and
production or use expected value method once PDF of wage is deÖned.
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equations for relative output, revenue, price and wage is given by the following,
q(i2)
q(i1)
= (
i2
i1
)"+1 (2.11a)
r(i2)
r(i1)
= (
i2
i1
)" (2.11b)
w(i2)
w(i1)
= (
i2
i1
) (2.11c)
p(i2)
p(i1)
= (
i2
i1
)1 (2.11d)
l(i2)
l(i1)
= (
i2
i1
)" (2.11e)
So a Örm with higher productivity produces more output, earns higher revenue, o§ers a
higher wage to itís workers, employs relatively more workers and charges a lower price.
2.3 Equilibrium in Autarky
Firms draw their productivity i from a distribution gi(i). Since only the Örms making positive
proÖt stay in the market, Örms value function is given by maxf0; i(i) g. Here  is the external
shock that a Örm has to exit in future7. Hence the free entry condition (FEC) is,
[1Gi(i)]
i(ei)

= fe (2.12)
Where, fe is the sunk cost to enter the market. This condition implies that Örms expected
future proÖt balance the Öxed cost to enter the market. After the prospective Örm under takes
the cost fe, it gets to draw the productivity parameter for the Örm i from the PDF gi(i):
Zero Cuto§ proÖt, on the other hand, deÖnes the relation between the average proÖt to
cuto§ level, that is derived from the deÖnition of average proÖt.
i( ei) = ri( ei)  f
7The mass of exiting Örms will be replaced by the mass of new entrees each period. This mechanism is well
understood from Melitz model.
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Now equation (2.11b) implies that ri( ei) = f( eii )" . The zero cuto§ proÖt (ZCP) is given
by the following equation:
i( ei) = f [
 ei
i
!"
 1]
= fki(

i ) (2.13)
Note that, ki(i ) =
 ei
i
"
 1: Equation (2.12) and (2.13) jointly identiÖes the domestic
cuto§ i in a closed economy:
[1Gi(i )]
fki(

i )

= fe (2.14)
LHS of the equation is the present discounted proÖt of the Örm upon drawing from the PDF
Gi(:): Lets deÖne Ji(i) = [1  Gi(i)]ki(i): For the rest of the paper let us consider Pareto
distribution, where gi(i) =
i

i+1
i
8i > 1 and for i > " for 8i; j. This assumption implies
that Ji(i) =
1

i
i
[ "i" ], hence it is obvious that J
0
i() < 0 and J
00
i () > 0. But the RHS of
equation (2.14) has only a constant. This implies that LHS intersects once and the solution to
the equilibrium is unique.
Let us assume that i < j , hence country i can be thought of the north and j is then south.
This implies that the domestic cuto§ at i is higher than j (i > 

j ), since 

c =
h
f
fe

"
c"
i 1
c
for 8c 2 i; j:
2.3.1 Distribution of employment at Autarky
Claim 6 Given the active mass of Örms Mi, a Örm draws i from gi(i) and employs li(i).
Hence, the distribution of employment in this economy is:
ei(i) =
Mii(i)li(i)
L 8 2 (i ;1) (2.15)
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The Pareto distribution implies that, i(i) =
i
i
i

i+1
i
for i > 

i and the employment
distribution simpliÖes to;
ei(i) =
1e"ie
i
i
i

i++1"
i
8 2 (i ;1) (2.16)
The employment distribution takes the form of Pareto distribution with location parameter
(i
i
ie"ie ) and the shape parameter (i++1"). ( See appendix for prove). The wage equation
(wi(i) = 

i ) and employment distribution leads to the weighted wage distribution of the
economy.
yi(wi) =
1e"ie i 
i
i w
"i

1
i 8wi 2 (

i ;1) (2.17)
This is the wage distribution weighted by the employment of the Örm for every observed
i. Note that this still remain a Pareto distribution, but with di§erent shape and location
parameter. (See appendix). This wage distribution is di§erent across countries since they arise
from asymmetric productivity distribution. However, every thing remains the same other than
shape parameter of the wage distribution since i < j :
Figure 2.1: PDF of wage distribution across country at autarky.
Since domestic cuto§ for north is higher, the PDF for north starts at a higher wage value
(wi(

i ) > wj(

j )) than the other country and also lies below the distribution of south.
To construct the Lorenz curve, I use the CDF (Yi(wi) =
241 w 1ii
!"i35) and average
wage (E(wi) = ei = R wiyi(wi)dwi) of the economy, hence the Lorenz curve is:
L(Yi) = 1 [1 Yi]
"i
"i (2.18)
Figure 2.2: Lorenz curve at autarky across country.
Claim 7 If wage is an increasing function (w = ) of Örms productivity with rent sharing
parameter of  2 (0; 1), then at autarky north observes higher inequality compare to south.
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The Lorenz curve Shows that north has more inequality than the south at autarky. This
inequality is observed because the high productive Örms in north is relatively bigger than the
south j. The resources in north is used more e¢ciently than the other country. Hence same level
of productive (such as ) Örm in di§erent countries observe that at north a Örm has access to
bigger market share and employ relatively more workers to satisfy the demand. This leads to a
situation where, relatively bigger share of the population in north compare to south works for
relatively high productive Örms. But at the same time this share of the population is not the
majority of the population in north as well as. This causes higher level of inequality in north
relative to south8.
2.4 Trade economy
Now Örms can engage in exporting activity. Exporting Örms have to undertake two additional
costs. Firms face a Öxed cost fx > f 1 ( An assumption to separate exporters from domestic
producers only) and transportation cost or tari§ of >1. All the sunk costs and Öxed costs are
paid in terms of the Önal output Yi and Yj . However now I can no longer normalize the price
index of both countries, since demand conditions are di§erent across countries. If I normalize
only one of the price index then Örms from the other country pays lower or higher Öxed costs.
For example, suppose I normalize Pi = 1; this implies that Pj > 1 since Gi %hr Gj : This makes
Öxed cost expensive in country j and the Öxed barrier to enter a market no longer stays Öxed
as Melitz paper.
To handle this problem I assume that Örmsí in country j (south) face a parameter c 2 (0; 1)
such that YiPi = cYjPj9: One peculiar result of the Melitz model is that, more productive Örms
charge lower price. It is due to this result the aggregate price index in country i is lower than
the other. The active mass of Örms in country i have higher aggregate productivity than the
other country, this leads to the dispersion in the price index. Since Pi = 1 by normalization,
one obvious choice of the contributor is P1j : This assumption makes the theory coherent and
8A simulation for the Gini coe§ecient conÖrms the result, where Gini at autarky for north "i = 3:1"
=0.1235>0.1099=Gini at autarky for south "j = 3:3"
9The parameter c makes the model consistant with Melitz literature. Without this assumption the interpre-
tation of the model becomes void.
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consistent with the literature of Örm heterogeneity10. Firms export price, revenue and proÖt is
expressed by:
pxi(xi) =  pi(i) (2.19)
rxi(xi) = Rj
"
xi

1
  1

Pj
1
= 1rj(xi) (2.20)
xi(xi) =
rxi(xi)

 fx = 
1rj(xi)

 fx (2.21)
Asymmetry across country implies that, revenue of a Örm with same level of productivity
is not same across countries (ri() 6= rj()): Total proÖt of the Örm given it observes i
is, total(i) = max[0; i(i)] + max[0; xi(i)]: The proÖt function establishes the connection
between export and domestic cuto§ across countries. The relation between the cuto§s is xi =
jA where A =
h
1 fxf
i 1
"
for 8i and j11: See appendix for complete derivation. Since local
markets marginal Örm determines the marginal foreign exporters and the shape parameter
determines the domestic cuto§ for both countries, too asymmetry across countries may lead to
a situation where all of domestic Örms in north becomes exporters. Generally this is not the
case in data and the equilibrium condition falls apart, hence I ignore the case of too asymmetry
and assume that 

xi
i
=
jA
i
> 1 .
Similar to the autarky case, this economy faces two types of aggregate productivity index.
Index faced by consumers is e"ti = 1Mti [Mie"di+MjPjx"e"xj ] and the index faced by producers
is discussed in the following section: Note that, this index is constructed from available variety
consumed by the end consumers. So for example, consumers have all the goods available from
domestic producers and some foreign goods available from exporters. Hence the total mass of
variety available to consumers isMti = Mi+MjPjx and Pjx =
1Gj(xj)
1Gj(j )
12. This index is similar
to the aggregate index deÖned by Demidovaís 2008 paper.
10An alternative method of addressing this problem is to impose trade balance condition by allowing a
trasfer of D by developing country. Hence the trade balance condition is: Mxi
R1
i
qxi(i)
gi(i)
1Gi(i)di =
Mxj
R1
j
qxj(j)
gj(j)
1Gj(j)dj + D: This will normalize the aggregate price index in both economy. However,
this method will turn the model into pertial equlibrium and welfare analysis is no longer applicable.
11Note that A > 1:
12Mi is determined from the labor market clearing condition of country "i".e"di and e"xi are the averages coming from domestic producers and exporters only respectively.
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2.4.1 Trade economy equilibrium
The FEC and ZCP together leads to the following expression in trade economy,
f
 Ji(

i ) +
fx
 Ji(

xi) = fe for : i; j (2.22)
The interpretation remains the same, however due to the additional term in LHS, the econ-
omy has a higher cuto§ for existing domestic Örm. This happens due to the increased competi-
tion coming from foreign market. More productive exporters enters the market with lower price
and drives the less productive domestic producers with higher price out from the market. This
mechanism is well known in Meltiz literature. With Pareto distribution this condition becomes
f

i
i
+ fx
(Aj)
i = fe[
i"
" ] for country i and j. Hence, these two conditions jointly deÖne the
domestic cuto§ for both countries in the (ij) space. Note that, these equations relates the
domestic cuto§ across countries.
i =
h
fe
f
i"
"  fxf

1
Aj
ii 1i = B(j)
i =
1
A
h
fe
fx
i"
"  ffx

1
j
ji 1j = D(j) (2.23)
Claim 8 As long as the export cuto§ is bigger than the domestic cuto§ for north (xi > 

i ),
hence the model follows all the assumptions, there exists a unique solution (i ; 

j) and 

xj >
xi > 

i > 

j :
See appendix for full derivation. Since export cuto§s are related by the domestic cuto§ of
other country and A > 1, the above inequality follows.
Mass of Örms
The mass of Örms active in the economy can be identiÖed by using the labor market clearing
condition. Now the exporters employe more worker to satisfy the additional demand and the
condition becomes:L = Mi
R1
di
li(i)
gi(i)
1Gi(di)di +MiPix
R1
xi
lxi(i)
gi(i)
1Gi(xi)di: By using the
optimal pricing rule by monopolist and equation (2.11b) the mass of Örms in the economy can
be expressed as:
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Mi =
L
  1
"
f
"di
Z 1
di
"i
gi(i)
1Gi(di)
di +
Pix

fx
"xi
Z 1
xi

"
i
gi(i)
1Gi(xi)
di
#1
(2.24)
Note that the active Örms from a country is lower than autarky. However now both
economies have some foreign Örms serving their local markets. So the total number of Örms
serving each market is Mti = Mi +MjPjx, for any i 6= j, and available variety to consumer
increases.
2.4.2 Distribution of employment and Lorenz curve at trade economy
Lets look at the aggregate productivity faced by producers, since it gives rise to employment
distribution in trade economy. This index looks at the total production in a country and takes
the average for their output. For example at country i, this index calculates average productivity
from the total output produced for their domestic market and output produced for export
market. Hence it uses Mi mass of variety produced inside a country for domestic market and
MiPix for mass of exporters who serve in south. This index can be expressed in two ways: a)
the productivity of all Örms producing for domestic market (i 2 (di;1)) and exporters only
(i 2 (xi;1)), b) productivity of Örms producing for domestic market only (i 2 (di; xi)) and
the productivity of Örms that serve both domestic and exporting market (i 2 (xi;1)). The
second method disaggregates the index in two groups: a) contribution coming from domestic
producers only and b) contribution coming from exporters and domestic producers. Hence the
productivity index by the second way is,
e"tei = 1Mtei [(1 Pix)Mi

xiedi" + PixMi(1 +  ")exi"] (2.25)
Where,

xiedi" = R xidi "i gi(i)1Gi(di)di and exi" = R1xi "i gi(i)1Gi(xi)di . The Örst
index ,

xiedi", refers to the Örms that serve only domestic market and the second index
,
exi", refers to the Örms that serve both domestic and export market. Note that, the
relative mass of Örms that are contributing to the productivity index is multiplied and the
total variety produced in country i is Mtei = Mi(1 + Pix). However when exported, exporters
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lose some goods in transit due to tari§ and/or transportation cost  . These Örms also serve in
domestic market during which they do not pay this per unit cost. Hence the exporters aggregate
index has two groups: a) when serving domestic market only the index becomes
exi" and
b) when serving export market only the index is discounted by tari§ and is
exi

"
. However,
the mass of Örms in this group remains same PixMi: Now the employment distribution in this
economy is similar to equation (2.16).
ei(i) =
 1e"tei 1Pix1+Pix i
i
di

i+1"+
i
8i 2 (di; xi)
1e"tei Pix1+Pix (1 +  ")
i
i
xi

i+1"+
i
8i 2 (xi;1)
(2.26)
Proof. Note that
R xi
di
i
i
di

i+1"
i
=

xiedi" and R1xi iixii+1"i =
exi" as deÖned
earlier. Hence the integral over  2 (x;1) the entire range of  adds up to unity (ei( =
1) = 1) and e0i(:) < 0 , so this is our employment distribution at trade:
The employment distribution in equation (2.26) has two parts: a) employment in domestic
producers only and b) employment in export and domestic producers. Note that, the marginal
exporters faces an increase in employment. Exporters Önd additional demand in the foreign
market. To satisfy this additional demand exporters hire more workers, that are released from
the exiting domestic Örms and existing domestic Örms that are shrinking. Trade does not e§ect
the shape of wage equation it just shifts it to the right. The employment distribution leads to
wage distribution at trade economy as well13.
yi(wti) =
 1e"tei 1Pix1+Pix i idi w
"i

1
ti 8wti 2 (

di ; 

xi )
1e"tei Pxi1+Pxi (1 +  ")i 
i
xi w
"i

1
ti 8wti 2 (

xi ;1)
(2.27)
Since exporters are serving two markets, they employ additional labor to produce some extra
units to serve foreign market. Hence the weighted payment to this segment of the workers is
higher even though the Örms o§er the same wage. This extra amount of labor is less e¢cient
since they face tari§. Hence the density has a jump at 

xi . This jump creates a distortion in
13The steps to Önd this density is similar to the case of autarky. The only di§erence is that now I apply the
transformation technique to distribution of employment in both sections of employment distribution separately.
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the labor market. Please refer to the Ögure 2.3 14:
Figure 2.3 : PDF of wage in trade for asymmetric countries.
Inside a country trade reallocates some workers from least paid exiting domestic Örms to
high paying exporting Örms. Note that the Örms who earn export status already have some
employment for domestic production, hence the new workers joining them earn same as old
workers. This reallocation o§ers higher wage to only one segment of the population. This makes
the tail of the distribution fat, hence the percentile of the highest earning population comes
from higher cuto§ than before.
Across country open market gives exporting opportunities to relatively low productive Örms
in north (xj > 

xi), since higher competition in north market. Exporting Örms in north have
bigger market share since they have smaller mass of Örms active inside the economy. Opening
up to trade results in a even bigger market share since they are relatively more productive than
exporters in south j. On the other hand Örms that survives the domestic market competition
in north, shrinks relatively more compare to south. This implies that domestic Örms in north
releases relatively more workers. This is why in north, workers serving in domestic market lose
more than the other countryís workers in their domestic market, but workers in export market
wins in north. However the disparity of wage in south is higher since some least productive Örms
are active in this economy that cannot survive the market competition in north (j < 

i ).
Claim 9 Given  and fx the Lorenz curve has the following expression from opening up for
trade:
Li(Yti) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
1
E(wti)
i11

1 1 Yti  i12 "i"i 8Yti2 (0; Yti(xi ))
L(Yti(

xi )) +
1
E(wti)
i21

0@1 1 (Yti  Yti(xi ))i22
"i
"i
1A 8Yti2 (Yti(xi ); 1)
(2.28)
14The Ögure is generated by using the following values for the paremeter. L = 100;  = :4;  = 4;  = 5;
f = 3; fx = 5; fi = 11; fe = 2;  = :2;  = 1:3:
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Where i11 =
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the Lorenz Curve of these economies have two segments. Now the relative wage of exporters is
higher than domestic producer only.
Proposition 10 If wage is an increasing function (w = ) of Örms productivity with rent
sharing parameter of  2 (0; 1) and model parameters are such that some Örms cannot access
the foreign market in north (xi > 

di); then opening up to trade relatively increase more wage
inequality in the south "j" than north "i".
Please refer to the Ögure 2.416:
Figure 2.4: Lorenz curve at trade across asymmetric countries.
The mass of Örms who can export suddenly Önds additional proÖt that can be earned by
exporting. To satisfy this additional demand of their goods in foreign market they hire some
workers, who used to work for exiting small Örms. These small Örms exit due to increased
competition. However the group of newly hired workers, who lost their jobs from exiting Örms,
earn same as some old workers hired by the same Örms with exporting capability. This distortion
increases the employment for exporters and increases the weight at this cuto§ and above. For
example; take any c = xc for 8c 2 i; j then, employment by this Örm jumps due to additional
production. This leads to a higher average wage at open market. The average wage of exporters
increases more than the average wage of domestic producers. This distortion in the average
wage across sectors (domestic and export market producers) leads to the higher inequality in a
country.
15To Önd the Lorenze curve we need to know the CDF (Yi(wti) that can be obtained by standard statistical
method) and the average wage E(wti). The expected wage will be E(wti) =
R
wtiyi(wti)dwti =
e"tie"tei = etei
16An additional simulation of Gini at trade across country conÖrms that, after trade inequality will increase
more in south relative to north, Gtrade;i = 0:1301 < Gtrade;j = 0:1319 , where they are Gini at trade for country
"i" and "j" respectively.
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south "j" observes that their wage distribution has higher spread than the other country.
This spread comes from the fact that, country "j" has less competition followed by a lower
domestic cuto§ at open economy setup. Hence the average wage coming from the domestic
producers only in this country is relatively lower than the north "i". On the other hand, ex-
porters in north pay a higher average wage than the other countryís exports. Exporters in north
observe a bigger market share increase than south and domestic producers in south observe a
less reduction of market share relative to north. It seems that the Örst e§ect dominates and
from open market south observes a higher inequality.
2.5 Comparative static analysis
The goal of this section is to study the e§ects of change in tari§ and Öxed cost to export.
But tari§ can change unilaterally or bilaterally. Hence the discussion goes into three di§erent
sections: a) symmetric bilateral tari§ reduction, b) unilateral tari§ reduction by south and
c) a symmetric decrease in Öxed cost to export. To study the comparative statics, I rely on
computer simulations17. The model parameters are as follows: L=100, =.4, =3.8, i=3.1,
j=3.3, f=3, fx=5.5, fe=2, =.2, =1.1 and l=1. Note that  and fx will take di§erent values
for comparative static analysis.
2.5.1 A symmetric bilateral tari§ reduction
For this exercise, I solve the entire model with two level of tari§s, a)  = 1:1 and b) = 1:3:
Note that this e§ect can be looked at from two di§erent perspectives, a) inside a country and
b) across countries. Please go to Ögure 2.5 and 2.6.
Figure 2.5: PDF of wage at symmetric tari§ reduction for north.
Figure 2.6: PDF of wage at symmetric tari§ reduction for south.
A decrease in tari§ opens up the export market to some highly productive domestic Örms
from both countries. This in turn increases the competition in both markets followed by an
17The parameter values that I assumed during the simulation is taken from Demidova (2008) and Helpman,
Yeaple and Melitz (2004) paper.
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increase in domestic cuto§ and decrease in export cuto§. Hence from a symmetric decrease in
tari§, both countries observe a shrink in the mass of Örms available in an economy. However
the Örms with export status (both old and new) expand more in both countries, where as
the domestic Örms that survive the increased competition expands relatively less to their own
exporters in north but contracts in south. This induces in a more e¢cient way of using labor
inside both economies. Hence the tail of the weighted wage distribution for both countries
become fatter relative to high tari§ case.
Figure 2.7: Lorenz at trade liberalization (1:1 <  < 1:3) north i = 3:1:
Figure 2.8: Lorenz at trade liberalization (1:1 <  < 1:3) south i = 3:3:
As tari§ decreases some workers are released from exiting domestic Örms. These workers
are absorbed by the expanding exporters in both countries and expanding domestic producers
in north. Since existing domestic Örms in south goes through a contraction of market share,
they release some workers as well. These workers are absorbed by their exporters spontaneously.
Hence in both countries now more workers have higher wage compared to high tari§ case. This
induces in a lower inequality in both countries as more people converge to the average wage.
An additional simulation result of GINI coe¢cient conÖrms the result. One interesting result
revealed from this simulation is that, north observes a relatively higher reduction in inequality
than the other country. Note that a decrease in GINI coe¢cient at north is 0.0079, where as
south observed a decrease of 0.00518.
Figure 2.9: PDF of wage at trade ( = 1:1) across asymmetric country.
Figure 2.10: PDF of wage at trade ( = 1:3) across asymmetric country.
At high tari§ some highly productive exporting Örms in north have relatively higher market
share compare to south, but some low productive domestic Örms at north have relatively lower
market share compare to other country. As tari§ decreases, more least productive domestic
Örms at north are forced to exit due to high competition and only the Örms that have relatively
18The GINI coe¢cients form the simulation is given in the following matrix,
GINI North i = 3:1 South j = 3:3
 = 1:1 0:1389 0:126
 = 1:3 0:1468 0:1311
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more market share survive the competition and expand. Note that, these exiting Örms in north
had lower market share than least productive domestic Örms in south. Hence, a symmetric tari§
reduction redistributes labor in a more e¢cient manner for north. The exporters on the other
hand expand more from tari§ reduction in north.
Figure 2.11:Lorenz at trade ( = 1:1) across asymmetric country.
Figure 2.12:Lorenz at trade ( = 1:3) across asymmetric country.
Decrease in tari§, decrease inequality in this setup. But north observes a higher decrease
in inequality than south. However north still have a higher inequality relative to her less north
trading partner. But symmetric tari§ reduction beneÖts north more.
2.5.2 Unilateral tari§ reduction of south
This section considers a case where the north imposes lower tari§ and south unilaterally matches
the tari§ rate of north. For this exercise, I will Öx the tari§ rate for north at  i = 1:1. But
south goes through a tari§ reduction from  j = 1:3 to  j = 1:1.
Figure 2.13: PDF of wage for north at unilateral tari§ reduction and  i = 1:1:
Figure 2.14: PDF of wage for south at unilateral tari§ reduction and  i = 1:1:
As south decrease their tari§ more Örms in north gets access to the export market. These
new exporters from north increases the competition in southís local market and forces the least
productive Örms to exit in south. The workers coming from exiting domestic Örms is absorbed by
expanding domestic and exporting Örms in south. Hence both export and surviving domestic
Örms go through an increase in market share, where export market goes through a bigger
expansion than domestic market. This increased competition in south in turn increases pressure
on exporters of north. Hence all the exporters go through a contraction of market share in north.
Now exporters of north increases competition in their local market. Since exporters from north
Önd a decrease in the demand for their goods in south, they sell these in the local market and
avoid tari§. Hence the goods become cheaper. These cheap goods drive the competition up and
earns larger market share for Örms with export status. It seems that the Örst e§ect dominates
for exporters, hence both exporters and domestic producers go through a contraction in north.
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Figure 2.15: Lorenz at trade liberalization (1:1 <  j < 1:3) north i = 3:1:
Figure 2.16: Lorenz at trade liberalization (1:1 <  j < 1:3) south i = 3:3:
As south decrease tari§, both countries observe a lower inequality. This mechanism is
symmetric to previous case. This change in the environment redistributes labor in such a way
that relatively more workers have access to higher wage. As a result the inequality decreases
inside both countries19.
Figure 2.17: PDF of wage at trade ( j = 1:1 and  i = 1:1) across countries.
Figure 2.18: PDF of wage at trade ( j = 1:3 and  i = 1:1) across countries.
A higher tari§ by south restricts the export market entry. Hence the marginal exporter from
north is relatively high productive due to high tari§. At this tari§, the exporters in the north
occupies a bigger market share relative to exporters of south. But north imposes relatively low
tari§. This makes the local market of north easy to access. As a result, exporters from south can
exploit the local market of north and increase the competition. Hence the domestic producers
in north shrink in mass and more productive Örms sustain the competition. However, both
domestic and export market in north enjoys a bigger market share.
As south decreases tari§, more exporters enter the local market of south and decrease the
market share of all exporters in north. These new exporters increase the competition in the local
market of south. Increased competition forces the least productive Örms out of the economy.
Now, this displaces some workers and causes the domestic and export Örms to expand in south.
At the same time, this reduces the market share for existing exporters from north. Hence the
dispersion of market share for exporters across country reduces. The reduction of export market
share by north now turns to increase competition in their local market. This shrinks the market
share for domestic producer only in south. However domestic producers go through an expansion
in south.
19The GINI coe¢cient across country by unilateral tari§ reduction by developing country
GINI Developed i = 3:1 Developing j = 3:3
 i = 1:1
 j = 1:1
0:1301 0:1238
 i = 1:1
 j = 1:3
0:1416 0:1303
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Figure 2.19: Lorenz at trade ( j = 1:1 and  i = 1:1) across asymmetric countries.
Figure 2.20: Lorenz at trade ( j = 1:3 and  i = 1:1) across asymmetric countries.
When south imposes a high tari§ both country observe a higher inequality in the economy.
However north observes a higher inequality, since now GINI coe¢cient at trade for north is
0.1416 but for south is 0.1303. As the unilateral tari§ reduction takes place, both country
observe a lower inequality in the economy. But now north has a GINI coe¢cient of 0.1301 and
south has 0.1238. This decrease in tari§ reduction by south lowers the inequality di§erential
across countries. north is better o§ maintaining a lower level of tari§ as it generates the lowest
level of inequality compare to symmetric decrease of bilateral tari§.
2.5.3 A decrease in Öxed cost to export fx
Following same kind of idea, let us consider two di§erent levels of fx and solve the entire model.
The Öxed cost to export fx, will vary from 5.5 to 7.5. Again at Örst I will look at the country
level and then compare them across countries.
Figure 2.21: PDF of wage (7:5 < fx < 5:5) at north ai=3.1
Figure 2.22: PDF of wage (7:5 < fx < 5:5) at south ai=3.3
A decrease in Öxed cost to export opens up exporting opportunities to some highly pro-
ductive domestic Örms. This decreases the export cuto§. These new exporters along with old
exporters observe an increase in their market share and expand. On the other hand, some least
productive domestic Örms are forced to exit the market from increased competition. They
release some workers in the economy. These workers are absorbed by the expanding surviving
Örms (both domestic and exporting Örms).
Figure2.23: Lorenz curve at trade liberalization (7:5 < fx < 5:5) for north ai=3.1
Figure2.24: Lorenz curve at trade liberalization (7:5 < fx < 5:5) for south ai=3.3
Since all the surviving Örms from decrease in Öxed cost to export go through an expansion,
now all the workers are better o§ since more workers have higher wage compare to higher
Öxed cost to export (7.5). This decreases inequality in both countries. The simulation of GINI
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coe¢cient conÖrms the result20. Similar to symmetric tari§ reduction, north observes a higher
reduction in inequality(GINIi = 0:0098) relatively to south(GINIj = 0:0076).
Figure 2.25: PDF of wage at trade (fx=5.5) across countries
Figure 2.26: PDF of wage at trade (fx=7.5) across countries
As Öxed cost to export decrease, exporters in north goes through a bigger expansion than
south. On the other hand relatively domestic producers in south expands more relative to most
domestic Örms of north.
Figure2.27: Lorenz at trade (fx=5.5) across asymmetric countries.
Figure2.28: Lorenz at trade (fx=7.5) across asymmetric countries.
A decrease in fx reduces inequality in both countries. However north has higher inequality
in both high and low fx value.
2.6 Welfare analysis
The aggregate welfare per worker in north has the following expression:

W
L

i
= E(wi) (2.29)
Since aggregate price index is normalized to one, the welfare only depends on the average
wage of the economy. Note that an increased competition due to opening of market for trade
increases the cuto§ for domestic market. As the cuto§ increases the minimum productivity
require to serve the domestic market increases. This results in higher wage and higher welfare
per worker in north "i".
20
GINI Developed country ai = 3:1 Developing country aj = 3:3
fx = 5:5 0:1389 0:126
fx = 7:5 0:1487 0:1336
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On the other hand, the price index Pj in south is greater than one. This imply that the
welfare per worker in south is: 
W
L

j
=
E(wj)
Pj
(2.30)
Note that, an increased competition will increase the domestic cuto§. Now the average wage
in the economy increases with the increased competition. Aggregate price index, on the other
hand, will decrease with an increase in domestic cuto§. Hence Any e§ect that causes in higher
competition, such as trade liberalization, will increase the welfare per worker in south as well .
As globalization takes place, countries open their market to all. This gives incentive for
high productive Örms to export and increase the competition. Now globalization, according to
this paper, can happen by the following four processes: a) countries go from autarky to trade,
b) countries decrease tari§ symmetrically, c) south unilaterally decrease tari§ to northís level
and d) a symmetric decrease of Öxed cost to export. Note that, all of them increase competition
and results in a higher welfare per worker for both countries. However, all of the procedures
above does not result in a lower inequality. For example, as countries go from autarky to trade
the inequality goes up in both countries.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper develops a model to study wage inequality across asymmetric countries created by
opening up to trade in a heterogenous Örms setup. It shows that trade will increase inequality
relatively more in south to north. Workers displacement from the autarky equilibrium to trade
will redistribute population in such a way to increase welfare that, it will result in creating some
wage inequality. This obviously will increase inequality inside both economy. On the other hand
the welfare will increase in both country as well.
A symmetric decrease in tari§ and Öxed cost to invest has similar e§ect on the economy.
These decrease will increase the mass of exporters and increase competition in both countries.
The exporters from both countries will go through an expansion and employ more labor that
is released from the domestic producers. This reallocation will end up providing a higher
labor payment to a bigger share of the population. Hence the inequality will decrease in both
countries. However inequality will relatively decrease more in north than south, even though
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north will have a higher inequality than the other. On the other hand both country will still
observe a welfare gain from this transition. Hence north will always beneÖt more from opening
up for trade than south.
A unilateral tari§ reduction by the south will reduce the inequality for both countries as
before. However, from the perspective of north it is better to impose a lower tari§ no matter
what the south does. This ensures the higher involvement of exporters from south and keeps
the competition higher. As a result, the economy employes labor more e¢ciently and keeps
the inequality level as low as possible. However, unilateral tari§ reduction will increase some
competition as well. This leads to a higher welfare per worker.
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  Figure	  2.7:	  Lorenz	  at	  trade	  liberalization	  (1.1<τ<1.3)	  North	  (αi	  =3.1).	  	  
	  	  	  Figure	  2.8:	  Lorenz	  at	  trade	  liberalization	  (1.1<τ<1.3)	  South	  (αj	  =3.3).	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  Figure	  2.9:	  PDF	  of	  wage	  at	  trade	  (τ=1.1)	  across	  asymmetric	  countries.	  	  	  
	  	  	  Figure	  2.10:	  PDF	  of	  wage	  at	  trade	  (τ=1.3)	  across	  asymmetric	  countries.	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  Figure	  2.11:	  Lorenz	  at	  trade	  (τ=1.1)	  across	  asymmetric	  countries.	  	  	  
	  	  Figure	  2.12:	  Lorenz	  at	  trade	  (τ=1.3)	  across	  asymmetric	  countries.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  
	   69	  
	  	  	  Figure	  2.13:	  PDF	  of	  wage	  for	  North	  at	  unilateral	  tariff	  reduction	  and	  τi=1.1	  	  
	  	  	  	  Figure	  2.14:	  PDF	  of	  wage	  for	  South	  at	  unilateral	  tariff	  reduction	  but	  τi=1.1	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  Figure	  2.15:	  Lorenz	  at	  trade	  liberalization	  (1.1<τj<1.3)	  North	  (αi=3.1)	  
	  	  Figure	  2.16:	  Lorenz	  at	  trade	  liberalization	  (1.1<τj<1.3)	  South	  (αj=3.3)	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  Figure	  2.17:	  PDF	  of	  wage	  at	  trade	  (τj=1.1	  and	  τi=1.1)	  across	  asymmetric	  countries.	  	  
	  	  	  Figure	  2.18:	  PDF	  of	  wage	  at	  trade	  (τj=1.3	  and	  τi=1.1)	  across	  asymmetric	  countries.	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  Figure	  2.19:	  Lorenz	  at	  trade	  (τj=1.1	  and	  τi=1.1)	  across	  asymmetric	  countries.	  	  
	  	  	  Figure	  2.20:	  Lorenz	  at	  trade	  (τj=1.3	  and	  τi=1.1)	  across	  asymmetric	  countries.	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Figure	  2.21:	  PDF	  of	  wage	  at	  trade	  (7.5<fx<5.5)	  for	  North	  αi=3.1	  	  
	  	  	  Figure	  2.22:	  PDF	  of	  wage	  at	  trade	  (7.5<fx<5.5)	  for	  South	  αj=3.3	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Figure	  2.23:	  Lorenz	  at	  trade	  liberalization	  (7.5<fx<5.5)	  for	  North	  αi=3.1.	  	  
	  	  Figure	  2.24:	  Lorenz	  at	  trade	  liberalization	  (7.5<fx<5.5)	  for	  South	  αj=3.3.	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  Figure	  2.25:	  PDF	  of	  wage	  at	  trade	  (fx=5.5)	  across	  asymmetric	  countries.	  	  
	  	  	  Figure	  2.26:	  PDF	  of	  wage	  at	  trade	  (fx=7.5)	  across	  asymmetric	  countries.	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Figure	  2.27:	  Lorenz	  at	  trade	  (fx=5.5)	  across	  asymmetric	  countries.	  	  
	  	  	  Figure	  2.28:	  Lorenz	  at	  trade	  (fx=7.5)	  across	  asymmetric	  countries.	  	  	  
	  
Chapter 3
Understanding the Sources of
Aggregate Productivity Growth.
The Case of Chilean Plants 79-96
3.1 Introduction
Both new and neoclassical trade theory talk about productivity growth due to globalization.
Neoclassical theories depend on the fact that some industries have comparative advantage
over others; hence countries specialize in industries in which they can produce output more
e¢ciently. However lately trade economists realized that countries can also trade similar goods.
They have showed the importance of intra industry reallocation and therefore interest shifted
to reallocation of resources across Örms and/or plants inside an industry. Both theories talk
about reallocation of resources that lead to aggregate productivity growth. In this chapter I
ask which of these theories contribute more to explaining the evolution of productivity growth
for Chile. Are there other forces that can explain the productivity growth for Chile?
Aggregate productivity is the weighted average of all the Örms or plants in an economy,
where these weights are deÖned by their market share. Empirically it has been shown that
these producers vary a lot in terms of their productivity, even when we narrowly deÖne their
sectors. This composition of productivity can change due to the change in composition of
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active Örms, entry Örms and lastly exiting Örms. Many studies showed that this composition of
Örms is an important factor in the evolution of productivity; such as Foster, Haltiwanger and
Krizan (2001); Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2013). These studies have suggested
a productivity decomposition into four di§erent components; productivity distribution shifts
among active Örms, market share reallocation among active Örms and obviously entry and exit.
The four component decomposition was Örst studied by Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992);
hereafter BHC. They tracked a Örm/plant over time and then decomposed the productivity
growth coming from surviving, entry and exiting Örm. Then the contribution from surviving
Örms further breaks down to within Örm increase in share and across Örm productivity growth.
Similar method has been adopted by Griliches and Regev (1995), here after GR, and Foster,
Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001), here after FHK. In particular they constructed some reference
level of productivity, ref , and then took the weighted average of the di§erence from this
reference level and Örmís productivity. Hence,in this context, the aggregate productivity becameP
i sale sharei (productivityi  ref ). GR took the average of two consecutive aggregate
productivities,  = (1 + 2)=2 , to be the reference level. FHK on the other hand took the
aggregate productivity of Örst period to be the reference level. Note that BHC always estimates
that entry e§ect as positive; however, this is not the case with GR and FHK as it has to be at
least larger than the reference level of productivity to have a positive impact on the growth of
aggregate productivity. This problem has been further addressed by Melitz and Polanec (2014),
hereafter MP, by considering the reference level to be the average productivity of continuing
Örms only in an industry.
The decomposition of aggregate productivity growth for Chilean economy was conducted
by Pavcnik (2002) for the time period of 1979-1986. She decomposed the growth into two
components. These components represent within Örm productivity growth and across Örm re-
allocation of resources. In this way the weighted average of the aggregate productivity can be
decomposed into two components, unweighted average productivity and a covariance term re-
spectively, was Örst discussed by Olley and Pakes (1996). A positive second term implies that a
productive Örm gains more in market share. Pavcnik found that from 1979-1986 aggregate TFP
grew 19%: 6.6% due to within plant productivity improvement and 12.7% due to reallocation
of resources from less to more productive Örms. Bergoeing & Repetto (2006), henceforth BR,
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decomposed the aggregate growth of Chilean manufacturing plants for 1980-2001. They applied
a four component decomposition, similar to BHC. They found that 96.7% of the growth took
place due to reallocation of resources. Firm entry played an important role as well.
In this paper, I will reopen the case study for chile for the time period of 1979-1996. Chile
is an interesting case for trade economists, since it went through a massive tari§ reduction
during the early 70s. Their industries where mostly state owned before 70s, but after 1973
they became privatized and had no protection. These e§ects exposed Chilean Örms to face high
level of competition as Chile got integrated to the world economy. These features make Chile a
good case study to analyze the trade models. However, Chilean economy went through a high
ináation rate through out the 70s and up to my period of interest. The average ináation from
1979 to 1996 was 19.45 percent1. To address this, I normalize all the prices in 1980 Chilean
Pesos. Lastly, the Latin American crisis in 1982 had the largest impact on Chilean economy.
This crisis is observed in all the estimates of TFP growth discussed in this paper.
I applied a six component decomposition north by Lewrick, Mohler and Weder (2014) hence-
forth LMW. The First one comes from the neoclassical trade models and accounts for realloca-
tion of resources to the industry with comparative advantage. This term is called inter industry
e§ect; hence forth IIE. The second term is the technology e§ect, TE, that represents the ex-
ternal technological shocks that arises from exposure to high competition and/or knowledge
spillover2. The next two terms, within Örm share e§ect and within Örm productivity e§ect,
jointly deÖnes within Örm e§ect from new trade theory; these two e§ects that deÖnes within
Örm e§ect are noted as WFSE and WFPE respectively. WFSE accounts for growth of Örmís
sale share and WFPE accounts for the productivity growth of these Örms. Firm entry e§ect,
FEE, accounts for growth in TFP coming from Örms who enter with above average productivity.
Firm exit e§ect, FXE, on the other hand accounts for growth coming from Örms who exit with
below average productivity.
In the literature, FEE and FXE went through quite substantial developments. FEE for
example, is considered to be positive only if the entry Örm has higher than some reference level
1The data on CPI is colleted from IMF data base from 1978-1997. From this Ináation information is
constructed.
2These are only two possible explainations for the growth of TE. In theory it is anything else that is not
captured by other components of the decomposition.
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productivity that has been discussed by GR and FHK. MP and LMW proposed that FEE should
have a positive e§ect on the growth of aggregate TFP only if the entering Örm is more productive
than the average productivity of the surviving Örms in that industry; and FXE should have
positive impact only if the exiting Örm is less productive than the average productivity of the
surviving Örms of that industry. In this way the construction of the counterfactual level of
productivity is more relevant and informative.
Another aspect of this decomposition involves estimating the productivity. For this paper
I considered two kinds of productivity estimates; value added per worker and total factor
productivity, TFP. Since these variables are in log form, value added per worker is simply the
di§erence between value added and labor input (V AL). To estimate TFP, on the other hand,
one has to estimate the Cobb Douglas production function. I used four methods to estimate this
production function; ordinary least square (OLS), Olley and Pakes (OP), Wooldridge (WOP)
and lastly Wooldridge with Öxed e§ect (WOPfe)3. These methods are discussed in the following
paragraph.
Value added per worker, exploits the fact that Value added is the di§erences between output
and materials. Hence, it predicts that productivity is just the di§erence between value added
and labor input. The second one is a simple linear Öt to the data. It is evident from the literature
that OLS gives us biased estimate, but it serves as a good bench mark model to compare our
results with other estimators. In their seminal paper, Olley and Pakes (1996), they exploited
the fact that investments and capital stocks of a plant are correlated. Hence, they use a higher
order polynomial of capital and investment as a control function and a two stage estimation
to correct for the endogeneity problem. Wooldridge (2009), WOP from above estimators, used
generalized method of moment to estimate this production function with control function in
one stage. Stoyanov, Zubanov and Lee (2015), hence forth SZL (2015), in their working paper
found that, WOP estimation still su§ers from Örm speciÖc shocks that harms the estimation of
production function. They added Örm speciÖc Öxed e§ects, WOPfe from above, to absorb these
shocks in the GMM setting of WOP.
This paper Önds that, for Chile it was not Örms productivity growth rather it was the general
3Pavcnik (2002) used OP regression and LMW (2014) used a method by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006),
Lavinsohn and Petrin (2003) along with OP. I excluded Lavinsohn and Petrin, since pooled regression reports
very low returns to scale compare to OP, WOP, WOPfe and even OLS.
80
technological progress that resulted in the aggregate productivity growth. The decomposition of
TFP evolution from 1979-96 using OP estimator, to compare the results with Pavcnik (2002),
reports a Örms productivity growth that refers to WFPE from LMW of 7.63%. Where as,
TE accounts for 84.23% of TFP growth. Firm share e§ect on the other hand, had a negative
impact over the entire time frame. Pavcnik found that the reallocation of resources corresponds
to 12.7%, I found that WFSE from OP estimation to align the comparison with her method
is -15.59% from 1979 to 1986. For my time frame WFSE accounts for a growth of -20.95%.
Hence WFSE and WFPE, jointly within Örm e§ect from new trade theory, is responsible for
a decrease of 13.32% of TFP growth. Pavcnik used a two component decomposition similar to
OP, one that does not consider the technology e§ect. This e§ect captures the growth of industry
average productivity over time. This growth is caused by external reasons such as exposure
to world competition, knowledge spillover, etc. As her decomposition does not account for this
external technological e§ect, this entire growth is absorbed by within Örm productivity growth
in her decomposition.
The paper also Önds that, Örm entry e§ect is almost negligible. However, data on entering
Örms are mostly incomplete. Hence, these e§ects may be biased. Firm exit e§ect has a negative
impact on the TFP growth. This implies that the exiting Örms are more productive than the
average TFP of surviving Örms. Lastly, IIE covaries a lot with the TFP growth. However, it
can have both positive and negative impact on TFP evolution depending on what method is
used to estimate the TFP.
In the next section I will lay out the theoretical breakdown of the decomposition, followed
by the estimation procedure for the production function and TFP. Section 4 will discuss the
data set. After that I will go through the decomposition of aggregate growth coming from all Öve
methods to estimate the productivity. Then I will discuss the results from the decomposition
and present concluding remarks.
3.2 The sources of productivity growth
International trade literature identiÖes three di§erent sources of productivity growth: inter-
industry e§ect, intra-industry e§ect and lastly technology e§ect. Inter-industry e§ect is iden-
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tiÖed by neoclassical trade theory, for example Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin model. This
generates reallocation from less productive industries to more productive industries, hence use
the resource more e¢ciently. As a result countries specialize in producing goods in which they
have comparative advantage. Intra-industry e§ect inspired the foundation of new trade theory,
that arises from Örm level heterogeneity. This e§ect shifts the production to more productive
Örms in the same industry. Lastly, the traditional technological growth can arise from research,
knowledge spill over or exposure to high competition; and is identiÖed as technology e§ect. This
paper uses the decomposition frame work north by LMW to study the productivity growth for
Chilean data from 1979-1996.
All methods start with a deÖnition of aggregate productivity at time t to be the weighted
average of Örmsí productivity. The weights correspond to Örms sale share relative to the total
sale by manufacturing industry. Hence, aggregate productivity at time t can be expressed as:
t =
JX
j=1
NjtX
i=1
sijt'ijt (3.1)
where, Njt is the number of active Örms in industry j at time t and J is the number of
industries. sijt is the Örmís sale share relative to the total yearly sale. Summing over all the
Örms in an industry gives the industry sale share (Sjt) relative to the total sale in a year. Hence
Sjt =
X
i
sijt and summing over all industry adds up to unity,
X
j
Sjt = 1: The expression for
TFP in equation (3.1) can be decomposed into two components, similar to OP decomposition,
as:
t =
JX
j=1
Sjt'jt +
JX
j=1
NjtX
i=1
Sjtesijte'ijt (3.2)
where, esijt = sijtSjt  sjt and e'ijt = 'ijt  'jt4: sjt and 'jt are the industry average sale
share and industry average TFP respectively. The term esijt represents the deviation of Örmís
sale share from the average sale share of the industry it belongs to. Similar interpretation is
applicable for the next term e'ijt, here the deviation is between Örmís TFP and their industry
4This method of decompostion is similar to the method of OP (1996).
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average TFP: Hence, the second term in equation (3.2) is the covariance between Örms sale
share and TFP. The Örst term is the industry level average TFP5. Consider two consecutive
time periods 0 and t, then the TFP evolution over time, t  0; is the time di§erence of
equation (3.2). Then the aggregate TFP growth can further decomposed into the following six
components6:
t  0 =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
X
j2J
(Sjt  Sj0)4 jt| {z }
Inter-industry E§ect
+
X
j2J
Sj0('
C
jt  'Cj0)| {z }
Technology E§ectX
j2J
X
i2C
Sj0esijt(e'ijt  e'ij0)| {z }
Within-Örm productivity e§ect
+
X
j2J
X
i2C
Sj0e'ij0(esijt  esij0)| {z }
Within-Örm share e§ectX
j2J
Sj0s
E
jt('
E
jt  'Cjt) +
X
j2J
X
i2E
Sj0esijte'ijt| {z }
Firm entry e§ectX
j2J
Sj0s
X
j0('
X
j0  'Cj0) +
X
j2J
X
i2E
Sj0esij0e'ij0| {z }
Firm exit e§ect
(3.3)
Note that Örms are separated by continuing, entering and exiting status. For each category,
I deÖne the industry average as 'jt = (
P
i2 'ijt)=N

jt for  = [C;E;X]: 4jt is the deviation
of industry TFP from average industry TFP7. As discussed previously, inter industry e§ect
captures the reallocation e§ect across industries with comparative advantage. This e§ect is
expected to be positive whenever a countryís production moves to the industry with comparative
advantage. As a result, the economy uses itís resources more e¢ciently and produces output
with comparative advantage.
A possible reason for a growth in technology e§ect can arise from knowledge spill over due
5This deÖnition of Aggregate TFP is used by Olley and Pakes, NIna Pavcnik and may other trade economists.
6This method is borrowed from LMW (2014) paper. The porve of the decomposition can be found in their
appendix.
7 Industry TFP is deÖned as, jt =
P
i(sijt=Sjt)'ijt:
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to globalization or external competition8. Exposure to the world competition, such as Chile,
makes the local markets competitive. This e§ect can drive up the average productivity of the
economy. Technology e§ect accounts for the increase in the average TFP of continuing Örms in
an industry. Thus, this e§ect holds the industry share constant at the base year and accounts for
the productivity improvement in an industry from continuing Örms only. Note that, Pavcnikís
decomposition does not isolate TE; as a result the contribution of this technological progress
is absorbed in both reallocation and Örmís productivity growth. This is why, both productivity
growth e§ect and reallocation e§ect seems to be relatively larger than LMW method.
Intra-indsutry e§ect has three components: a) within Örm e§ect, b) Örm entry e§ect and c)
Örm exit e§ect. Within Örm e§ect then breaks down into two parts: within Örm productivity
e§ect and within Örm share e§ect. These four e§ects capture the e§ect of globalization on
aggregate growth described by new trade theory. Most productive Örms are expected to self
identify as exporters and go through an expansion. This e§ect is captured by within Örm share
e§ect. Whenever a Örm with above average productivity goes through an expansion, WFSE
will be positive. Within Örm productivity e§ect captures the productivity growth of these
Örms. Very small evidence is found in support of WFPE. Exiting and entering Örms TFPs are
compared to the average productivity of the continuing Örms in that industry. Hence an entering
Örm increases the TFP evolution, if it is more productive than the average of continuing Örms
of that industry. Similarly, an exiting Örm increases the TFP growth only if it is less productive
than the average of continuing Örms in that industry.
3.2.1 Estimation of Productivity
As discussed previously, this paper considers two measures of productivity; value added per
worker and TFP. Value added per worker is fairly simple and a good starting point to view the
data. It exploits the deÖnition of value added, which is the di§erence between Örmís output and
material input. Since these variables are all expressed in natural log, value added per worker
simple becomes the di§erence between value added and labor input. Hence, the expression
for value added per worker, hence forth VAL, becomes VAL=value added - labor input. This
8The technology e§ect can capture the common productivity growth in an industry that can come from any
external e§ect.
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method is expected to over estimate productivity, as it ignores the growth of capital that may
contribute to the growth of VAL.
Estimation of the total factor productivity, on the other hand, begins with identifying the
production function. Suppose Örm i produces output Qijt at time t and serves in the industry
j: A Örm has three factor inputs: a) labor (Lijt), b) capital (Kijt) and c) intermediates (Mijt).
Suppose they all face a Cobb-Douglas production function, Qijt = 'ijtL
l
ijtK
k
ijtM
m
ijt ; and the
TFP is identiÖed by 'ijt. Taking natural log to this production function leads to the basic
estimation equation: qijt = 0+llijt + kkijt + mmijt + !ijt + "ijt; where I assume that
'ijt = exp(0 + !ijt + "ijt). Note that "ijt is assumed to be iid normal, which is a common
assumption. 0 is the time invariant measure of average productivity across all plants and
!ijt is the plant speciÖc productivity level. At aggregate level Örmís output may vary due to
industry-year speciÖc e§ect. Hence, for pooled regression I include these Öxed e§ects in the
model and it becomes
qijt = 0 + llijt + kkijt + mmijt + !ijt + jt + "ijt (3.4)
Where jt is the industry-year Öxed e§ects. For industry level analysis I added yearly Öxed
e§ect instead of industry-year Öxed e§ects. The estimation equation at industry level then
becomes,
qijt = 0+llijt + kkijt + mmijt + !ijt + t + "ijt (3.5)
where, t is a vector of yearly Öxed e§ects. I use four di§erent methods to estimate the
production function. OLS is the simplest one imaginable that Öts a linear line to the data
and does not worry about the fact that the model su§ers from endogeneity problem. OP uses a
control function to control the unobserved variation and a two step estimation method to correct
for endogeneity bias. WOP is an extension of OP that uses a one step GMM estimation
method to simultaneously estimate the coe¢cient from the problem addressed by OP. The
last estimator , WOPfe, incorporates a Örm speciÖc Öxed e§ect to control for any unobserved
variation in output. SZL (2015) used the one step GMM approach of WOP with Örm level Öxed
e§ects. A variety of estimators are used to study the case of Chile, as Chile went through a lot
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of restructuring from early 70s till the end of the time frame. As a result, I can compare and
contrast the decomposition e§ect across di§erent methods. At last TFP of the plant can be
estimated by the di§erence between Örmís output and estimated output. Hence, the expression
is given by, TFPijt = qijt  bllijt  bkkijt  bmmijt9:
3.3 Data
The plant level data has been collected from statistical agencies, Instituto Nacional de Estadis-
tica. This data has been extensively used in trade literature. The data set is an unbalanced
panel of 10,927 plants over the period of 1979 to 1996 and has total 86,168 data points of man-
ufacturing sector only. These plants compete in 22 di§erent industries, those are identiÖed by
three digit industry code. The data set identiÖes these plants with at least 6 or more workers by
unique id. These Örms are uniquely identiÖed to the industry they belong to and are followed
when they change industry as well. Plants changing industry are identiÖed as exiting Örms from
the industry they used to serve and than entering Örms in the new industry where they will
serve. The data set consists of plant level factor input information, such as skilled and unskilled
labor, investments in machinery, land, real estate, Öxed asset, total asset etc. On the other hand
it has information on Örms sales, inventories, proÖt/loss, gross output etc. Using the data set,
variables such as capital, labor, intermediate inputs and output are produced10.
Table 1: Summary statistics of the data set
Year 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1996
Number of Firms 5814 4484 4333 4498 4765 5082 5466
Capital/Employee1 57 75 55 39 35 36 42
Intermediates/Employee1 :85 1 4 8 13 19 25
Investment/Employee2 51 57 41 45 132 83 120
Output/Employee3 1 2 7 13 22 32 43
Employee3 311 230 266 343 392 425 423
9Note that, the TFP growth in equation (3.3) is an approximation as the measure of TFP is in natural log
instead of levels.
10The description of variable generation for this paper can be found in data appendix.
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Notes: These are sample averages of the selected year. 1:Capital/Employee Intermediates/Employee
are in Chilean Peso thousands. 2 :In Chilean Peso. 3 :In thousands.
The table shows summary statistics for Chilean Örms. Over the period of study capital
per employee reached the lowest at 1991. It shows a decline after 1982 then again starts
to pick up in 1996. Intermediate input per employee shows a steady increase over time and
investment per employee áuctuates more. It is important to remember that during this period
the average ináation was 19.45%. Hence, the depreciation of capital was very high as well.
Output per worker seems to have a steady growth. A lot of the Örms lost their business. The
total percentage change in the number of Örm over the period is approximately -4%.
3.4 Results
In this section, I will start by presenting the TFP estimation and then go into the six components
decomposition for Chilean aggregate productivity growth.
3.4.1 TFP Estimates
The table below uses a pooled regression that refers to the model described in equation (3.4).
This estimate the production function using four di§erent methods: OLS, OP, WOP and lastly
WOPfe. The pooled regression includes Industry-year Öxed e§ects in the models. They absorb
any industry level or yearly shocks that a§ected Örmís sale.
Table 2: Production function estimate (pooled regression)
OLS
Labor 0:273
Capital 0:072
Intermediates 0:744
Returns to scale 1:089
OP
0:231
0:094
0:731
1:056
WOP
0:211
0:081
0:767
1:059
WOPfe
0:205
0:039
0:752
0:996
OLS has highest returns to scale relative to other estimators. Among the return on factor
inputs, labor and intermediate inputs have similar contribution to production across di§erent
estimators. The return on capital varies a lot, relative to other factor returns, across di§erent
estimators and has very small impact on production. The highest estimated returns on factor
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input across all methods are: labor from OLS of 0.273, capital from OP of 0.094 and lastly
intermediates from WOP of 0.767. All of the estimators other than WOPfe, which exhibits
decreasing returns to scale, exhibit increasing returns to scale.
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of estimated TFP for four di§erent methods. The
table shows that, WOPfe has the highest mean among the all four estimators. OLS and OP, on
the other hand, predicts similar mean TFP. WOP reports the smallest possible mean.
Table 3: Summary Statistics of estimated TFP
OLS OP WOP WOPfe
Mean 1:468 1:401 1:226 1:875
Standard Deviation 0:725 0:859 0:761 0:939
It is also quite clear that, WOPfe predicts most variation among them. Interestingly, OLS
predicts smallest variation from the mean. OLS and WOP reports vary similar variation.
3.4.2 Aggregate Productivity Growth Decomposition
Five di§erent estimators for aggregate productivity growth give a diverse picture of the Chilean
economy. The range of productivity estimate varies from a maximum growth of 317.25% from
VAL and a minimum of 69.56% using WOPfe. However, this is expected as VAL over estimates
the productivity growth since it does not consider the growth of capital at all. The rest of the
estimators report: 80.62% using OP, 75.94% using OLS and lastly 70.49% from WOP. These
four estimators of TFP report reasonable predictions regarding itís growth. Figure 3.1 reports
the productivity level predicted by all Öve estimators and estimation by OP, OLS and WOPfe
and WOP are dominated by VAL. As discussed previously, VAL is expected to over estimate
the growth as it does not consider the e§ect of capital contribution to productivity evolution
for the Örms. When restricted up to 1986, the growth predicted by OP for six component
decomposition is around 20.74%. However Pavcnik (2002) found this growth to be 19.3%; this
paper Önds a similar growth of 19.58%, when applied the two component decomposition.
Figure 3.2 reports the change in growth rate of productivity over time using all Öve methods.
OP, OLS, WOP and WOPfe shows relatively small changes compared to VAL estimators. The
Latin American crisis of 1982 slowed down this growth for all four methods other than VAL,
that exhibits a huge fall in the productivity growth a year before. Other than that, all the
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productivity reports one more fall in growth rate in 1986.
Figure 3.3.1-3.3.5 decompose the growth of productivity into six components, such that the
reported aggregate growth resembles the size of relative growth compare to other years11. Hence
the length of each bar represents how large the growth was relative to other years and each
component represents the percentage contributed to that growth. As a consequence, for each
year the total contribution coming from all six components adds up to 100%. The decomposition
for all the Öve methods seems to have some similar patterns. For example, TE has a very strong
positive and WFSE has a negative impact on Productivity growth for all Öve methods. FXE
is negative for all of them other than WOP, this implies that on an average the exiting Örms
were more productive than the average of the industries they belong to. The data records 3991
entry Örms, but these Örms lack factor input data that makes the estimation impossible. This
e§ects all the estimators, hence FEE plays almost an insigniÖcant role in the growth of Chilean
economy. IIE has asymmetric e§ect on the TFP growth, hence I will discuss it separately along
with other e§ects in details. Lastly, WFPE plays a marginal positive impact on the evolution
of TFP.
IIE has negative impact in only WOPfe estimator that predicts a decrease of 1.73%. Hence,
this decomposition predicts that resources have been reallocated to less productive industries
due to globalization. The most dominant impact of IIE is observed with VAL estimator, that
estimates a growth of 12.19%. Among the other reasonable estimators the highest estimated
inter industry reallocation comes from WOP estimator to be 10.42%. Given that Chile observe
a TFP growth around 70%, the impact of IIE seems to be notable small.
Secondly, WFSE has negative impact form all the estimators. However it is important to
discuss within Örm e§ect, that is the total e§ect from WFSE and WFPE, since this refers to
reallocation across Örms in an industry as described by trade models with Örm heterogeneity.
WFPE seems to have a positive impact for most of them, but relatively smaller than WFSE
in absolute value12. As a result, within Örm reallocation e§ect is negative and implies that
resources have shifted to less productive Örms over time.
FEE and FXE are also the components north by new trade theory, that account for negative
11Figure 3.3.1-3.3.5 reports the decomposition results from Table 4-8 from Table Appendix.
12Growth in Örmís productivity was also predicted by Pavnick (2002).
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impact on productivity growth for all the estimators other than VAL. FXE seems to have
negative impact on the TFP growth, as exiting Örms on an average are more productive than
the averages of their industry TFP. FEE lacks information on Örm entry and as a result it
has negligible e§ect on the growth. Among them FXE dominates the contribution coming from
entry and exit. As a result, jointly they decrease the growth of TFP evolution. This implies
that both classical and new trade theory plays a minimal role in the evolution of productivity
for Chilean economy.
Lastly, the most important component of this growth for Chile came from TE. As discussed
previously, this component reports positive growth for all Öve methods of productivity esti-
mation. Leaving VAL aside, since it predicts an unreasonable positive growth, this component
reports a growth of 74.56% from OLS, 83.63% from WOPfe, 72.48% from WOP and lastly
84.23% from OP. It is possible to imagine a situation, where entry Örms are relatively more
productive than the average productivity of the industries they belong to. These Örms in the
consecutive period may pushed the TE up as continuing Örms of that industry. Hence, the lack
of data on entry Örmís factor input may lead to over estimate of TE.
The six component decomposition is able to identify the technological progress that is ob-
served as industry growth in this method, not as Örms productivity growth in Pavcnikís decom-
position, is the answer to understand the divergence of results from herís to this decomposition
method. As this growth is absorbed by within Örm productivity growth, it seems that better
plants got bigger as well by the two component decomposition. To study this, I restricted the
six component decomposition up to year 1986 and constructed a two component decomposition,
similar to her work, for OP estimation of TFP to compare them. Table 8 from Appendix B
reports the decomposition results for two component decomposition. The Örst component iden-
tiÖes the reallocation e§ect, that accounts for reallocation across Örms, and second component
refers to Örmís productivity growth.
Pavcnikís decomposition reports a 6.6% increase in Örmís productivity, which is similar to
WFPE in this paper, and a 12.7% increase in reallocation across Örm (that resembles WFSE
in this paper). The parallel components from this paper representing Pavcnikís decomposition
reports 10% increase in WFPE and 15.59% decrease in WFSE. Again TE dominates in this
time frame and reports 32.54% contribution to the TFP evolution. When restricted up to 1986,
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all the components north from classical and new trade theory reports a negative impact on
growth. For example, IIE decreases 5.36%, within Örm e§ect jointly reports 5.59% decrease
and lastly FEE & FXE had a marginal negative impact of 0.08%. Hence this is obvious that,
20.74% increase in TFP growth is solely caused by TE.
3.5 Conclusion
The paper studies the aggregate productivity growth decomposition for the case of Chile from
1979-96. It uses two deÖnition of productivity, value added per worker and total factor produc-
tivity. Then, four di§erent methods where used to estimate TFP; these are OLS, OP, WOP
and lastly WOPfe. Right after the reformation in early 70s, Chile decentralized her industries
and plants faced world competition for the Örst time. This makes Chile a very interesting case
study for trade economists.
Previously, Pavcnik studied the Chilean economy and found that within Örm productivity
improvement was the dominant factor in TFP growth. Hence, new trade theory was able
to describe the bigger picture. However this paper Önds that, The TFP growth observed in
the data is mostly coming from the growth in technological progress. The exposure to high
competition forces the aggregate productivity of the economy to rise. This in turn shifts the
production away from relatively high productive Örms, decreasing the within Örm share e§ect
over the period. This implies that, the intra-industry e§ect described by the new trade theory
did not play that big of a role from the restructuring of Chilean economy as described in the
previous studies.
Notably, neither IIE nor FEE or FXE contributed to the growth of TFP either. It may be
the case that, lack of data on Örm entry failed to report the entry of high productive Örms.
These Örms may have contributed to the average productivity growth of industries they belong
to.
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Tables
Table 4. Decomposition of aggregate growth by VAL
year IIE TE WFPE WFSE FEE FXE        Total
1980 0.061 0.379 0.024 -0.074 0.016 0.028 0.378
1981 -0.043 0.219 -0.017 -0.128 0.016 0.008 0.038
1982 0.128 0.071 0.159 -0.033 0.008 0.040 0.293
1983 0.074 0.299 0.102 -0.077 0.027 0.015 0.410
1984 -0.039 0.313 0.082 -0.152 0.023 0.014 0.213
1985 0.041 0.242 0.069 -0.027 0.007 0.011 0.321
1986 0.021 0.101 -0.011 -0.037 0.008 0.004 0.078
1987 -0.046 0.198 0.057 -0.070 0.044 0.005 0.177
1988 0.079 0.221 0.045 -0.126 0.128 0.013 0.333
1989 -0.019 0.237 0.023 0.001 0.046 0.031 0.258
1990 -0.067 0.237 0.020 -0.004 0.009 0.008 0.187
1991 -0.046 0.188 0.032 -0.078 0.023 0.013 0.106
1992 -0.004 0.243 -0.062 -0.074 0.036 0.011 0.128
1993 -0.025 0.159 0.028 -0.055 0.015 0.023 0.099
1994 0.007 0.146 0.005 -0.028 0.014 0.014 0.129
1995 -0.012 0.089 0.043 0.011 0.028 0.014 0.144
1996 0.011 0.096 0.033 -0.096 0.000
Table 5. Decomposition of aggregate growth by OLS
year IIE TE WFPE WFSE FEE FXE Total
1980 0.022 0.057 -0.007 -0.020 0.003 0.002 0.053
1981 -0.004 0.053 0.033 -0.027 0.001 0.000 0.055
1982 -0.016 0.025 0.065 -0.016 0.000 0.003 0.055
1983 0.000 0.013 0.001 -0.023 0.000 0.002 -0.010
1984 0.013 0.058 0.019 -0.031 0.000 0.002 0.058
1985 -0.002 0.043 -0.006 -0.005 0.000 0.001 0.030
1986 -0.005 0.019 -0.015 -0.007 0.000 0.001 -0.009
1987 0.027 0.070 0.015 -0.008 0.000 0.001 0.103
1988 0.035 0.027 0.010 0.007 0.000 -0.001 0.079
1989 0.038 0.051 -0.005 -0.004 0.000 0.003 0.076
1990 -0.004 0.073 0.017 -0.015 0.000 0.000 0.070
1991 -0.031 0.058 -0.013 -0.010 0.000 0.001 0.003
1992 0.021 0.055 -0.018 -0.010 0.000 0.001 0.048
1993 -0.016 0.040 -0.012 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.009
1994 0.000 0.034 -0.012 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.016
1995 0.022 0.039 0.023 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.086
1996 -0.005 0.030 -0.001 -0.004 0.000
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Table 6. Decomposition from OP estimation.
year IIE TE WFPE WFSE FEE FXE Total
1980 0.014 0.073 -0.009 -0.036 0.003 0.002 0.043
1981 0.003 0.060 0.030 -0.024 0.001 0.001 0.070
1982 -0.069 0.011 0.050 -0.024 0.001 0.004 -0.035
1983 0.000 0.026 0.017 -0.018 0.000 0.003 0.023
1984 0.026 0.063 0.009 -0.032 0.000 0.002 0.064
1985 -0.009 0.061 0.001 -0.009 0.000 0.002 0.041
1986 -0.018 0.031 0.002 -0.013 0.000 0.001 0.002
1987 0.042 0.052 0.030 -0.008 0.000 0.002 0.115
1988 0.025 0.046 -0.003 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.073
1989 0.031 0.059 -0.020 -0.010 0.000 0.003 0.057
1990 0.013 0.070 0.001 -0.013 0.000 0.000 0.072
1991 0.004 0.068 0.008 -0.008 0.000 0.001 0.071
1992 0.018 0.068 -0.028 -0.012 0.000 0.000 0.046
1993 0.005 0.050 -0.008 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.047
1994 -0.011 0.035 -0.010 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.008
1995 0.021 0.035 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.074
1996 -0.005 0.033 -0.011 -0.003 0.000
Table 7. Decomposition of aggregate growth using WOP estimator
year IIE TE WFPE WFSE FEE FXE Total
1980 -0.024 0.052 -0.008 -0.023 0.003 -0.002 -0.002
1981 0.073 0.054 0.018 -0.019 0.001 0.000 0.127
1982 -0.148 0.019 0.061 -0.008 0.000 -0.002 -0.078
1983 -0.051 0.000 0.011 -0.020 0.000 -0.002 -0.064
1984 0.003 0.064 0.014 -0.032 0.000 -0.002 0.046
1985 0.018 0.052 -0.016 -0.006 0.000 -0.001 0.047
1986 0.003 0.019 -0.010 -0.010 0.000 0.000 0.003
1987 -0.005 0.078 0.006 -0.009 0.000 -0.001 0.069
1988 -0.043 0.038 -0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.002 -0.008
1989 0.000 0.042 0.001 -0.008 0.000 -0.004 0.031
1990 0.046 0.067 -0.004 -0.011 0.000 0.000 0.098
1991 0.087 0.052 -0.001 -0.009 0.000 0.000 0.129
1992 0.043 0.056 -0.014 -0.010 0.000 0.003 0.077
1993 0.120 0.042 -0.027 -0.005 0.000 0.001 0.131
1994 -0.045 0.023 -0.001 -0.006 0.000 0.000 -0.028
1995 -0.052 0.047 0.016 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.015
1996 0.078 0.021 -0.003 -0.005 0.000
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Table 8. Decomposition of aggregate growth by WOPfe
year IIE TE WFPE WFSE FEE FXE Total
1980 0.014 0.068 0.015 -0.037 0.006 0.003 0.062
1981 0.027 0.063 0.014 -0.022 0.002 0.001 0.084
1982 -0.057 0.005 0.040 -0.009 0.000 0.011 -0.032
1983 0.033 0.026 0.014 -0.009 0.000 0.006 0.058
1984 0.027 0.063 0.006 -0.026 0.000 0.004 0.066
1985 -0.013 0.058 -0.001 -0.006 0.000 0.002 0.035
1986 -0.084 0.021 -0.001 0.007 0.000 0.000 -0.057
1987 0.017 0.060 0.032 -0.004 0.000 0.002 0.103
1988 0.002 0.048 -0.020 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.030
1989 0.022 0.061 -0.011 -0.012 0.000 0.006 0.054
1990 0.000 0.067 0.014 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.074
1991 0.004 0.067 0.012 -0.009 0.000 0.004 0.070
1992 0.017 0.072 -0.028 -0.008 0.000 0.000 0.053
1993 -0.001 0.048 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.049
1994 -0.046 0.036 -0.015 0.003 0.000 0.001 -0.023
1995 0.052 0.040 0.018 0.008 0.000 0.003 0.114
1996 -0.032 0.034 -0.004 0.001 0.000
Table 9. Two components decomposition of OP estimation 1979-89
year RE_op PGE_op agg_growth
1980 -0.027 0.048 0.021
1981 -0.025 0.088 0.063
1982 -0.106 0.075 -0.031
1983 -0.016 0.042 0.026
1984 -0.002 0.073 0.071
1985 -0.022 0.068 0.045
1986 -0.022 0.024 0.001
1987 0.033 0.090 0.123
1988 0.050 0.040 0.091
1989 0.010 0.049 0.059
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Figure	  3.1:	  Aggregate	  growth	  of	  Chile	  1979-­‐96	  
	  Figure	  3.2:	  Aggregate	  growth	  rate	  1979-­‐96.	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  Figure	  3.3.1:	  Six	  components	  of	  growth	  from	  VAL.	  
	  Figure	  3.3.2:	  Six	  components	  of	  growth	  from	  OLS.	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Figure	  3.3.3:	  Six	  components	  of	  growth	  from	  OP.	  
	  Figure	  3.3.4:	  Six	  components	  of	  growth	  from	  WOP.	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Figure	  3.3.5:	  Six	  components	  of	  growth	  from	  WOPfe.	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Appendix A: Chapter 1
A.1 Derivation of mass of Örms.
Use the expression for labor supply of Örms given it observes : Hence the labor market
clearing condition becomes L = M
R1

q()

g()
1G()d: Now use the optimal pricing rule by
monopolist to express 1 = p()1 
; and use this to obtain the left hand side of the
expression to be: M
R1
 r()
1
 
 g()
1G()d: By using equation (1.9b), hence by taking the
ratio of revenues for Örms productivity to domestic cuto§ productivity implies r() =



"
f:
Lastly by rearranging the terms, the expression for mass of Örms becomes:
Ma =
L
(  1)f

1

" Z 1

"
g()
1G()d
1
A.2 Derivation of employment distribution.
Take employment ratio of any Örm with the average Örm to Önd,(1.9e);
l()
l(e) = (e)"
Now take the numerator of employment distribution and use the above relation in it:
M
Z
8=
l()g()d =Ml(e) = L: Note that e" = Z
8=
"g()d; hence I get
M
R1
 g()l()d
L =
1 and this proves that it is the density of employment. By using Pareto assumption and this I
can Önd that.
e() = Ml(
e)
L
1e" 


+1 8 2 (;1)
where  is the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution. Hence we get e() = 1e" 


+1
8 2 (;1): Note that the distribution of employment does not depend on the employment
level or endowment of labor. However it is solely deÖned by the density of productivity.
A Pareto distribution for the productivity density g() = 

+1
for  >  +  to Önd the
distribution function to be:
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e() = 1e" 


+1 8 2 (;1) (A.1)
A.3 Derivation of weighted wage distribution.
Take the wage equation and invert it to Önd
w
1
 = 
d =
1

w
1

1dw
Now apply the Jacobean approach of random variable transformation technique y(w) =
1e"w "1 1w 11to Önd the PDF of wage to be y(w) = 1e"  w  1 for all w 2 ( ;1)
:
A.4 Derivation of Lorenz curve.
First use the PDF of wage to convert it to CDF and Önd the expected wage from it. Once
CDF is attained, isolate wage (w) to the left had side and Önd the expression for wage as
w=f(Y). Now we can apply the standard statistical method to Önd the Lorenz curve.
From the deÖnition of Lorenz curve we get :
L(Y ) =
1
E(w)
1e"  
Z w(Y )

x
"

dx
This will simplify to the Lorenz curve at autarky. For trade and FDI equilibrium, apply
same method to corresponding segments of wage distribution.
A.5 Derivation of mass of Örms at trade economy.
For trade economy exporters require additional workers to serve export market and is given
by: lx() =
qx()
 =
rx()

1
 
; by using the optimal pricing rule of monopolist in export
market second equality can be obtained. Again by equation (1.9b), the revenue can be ex-
pressed as rx() =


x
"
fx: Use this to determine the labor demanded for exporting activity,
MPx(1)

fx
"x
R1
x
" g()1G(x)di:
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Labor demand for domestic market production only, on the other hand, remains the same
as autarky economy. Hence labor market clearing condition becomes:
L =M(  1)
"
f
"
Z 1

"
g()
1G()d+
Px

fx
"x
Z 1
x
"
g()
1G()d
#
By rearranging this condition the expression for mass of Örm will be given by equation
(1.21).
A.5 Derivation of mass of Örms at FDI economy.
Investing Örms require relatively more workers when they obtain FDI status. As a result,
the additional labor demand of a Örm with FDI status is given by: lI() lx() = qI()qx() :
Note that, qx() = q() and qI() = q(). Hence, qI()  qx() = (1  )qI(): By
using optimal pricing rule for monopolist in the investment market simpliÖes the expression to
be: lI()  lx() = (1  )rI()1 : Lastly, use equation (1.9b) to Önd the expression
for revenue, rI() =


I
"
(fI  fx), to use in the labor demand function by investing Örms.
Hence the total labor demand by all the investing Örms in an economy is given by: MPI(1 
)(  1)fIfx
"I
R1
I

" g()
1G(I )d:
Labor demand by exporting Örms for exporting activity only is given by:
M(PxPI)(1)

fx
"x
R I
x
" g()1G(x)d: Note that, a mass of exporters converted to investors
now, as a result the mass decreases. Labor demand by domestic producers only still remains
the same as autarky economy. Lastly, the labor market clearing condition implies:
L =M(  1)
24 f" R1 " g()1G()d+ PxPI fx"x R Ix " g()1G(x)d
+PI(1 )fIfx"I
R1
I
" g()1G(I )d
35
Rearranging this leads to equation(1.31).
Appendix B: Chapter 2
B.1 Relation between export and domestic cuto§ across asymmetric countries
Take the ratio of revenue at domestic cuto§ across counties.
ri(

i )
rj(

j )
=

i
j
"
=

Pj
Pi
1 Rj
Ri
(3.6)
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note that ri(i ) = f for i and j. Now lets take the ratio of export to domestic cuto§ in
a country.
rxi(

xi)
ri(

i )
=

ix
i
"
=

Pi
Pj
1 Ri
Rj
1
fx
f
(3.7)
and lastly lets look at the ratio of export cuto§ across country.
rxi(

xi)
rxj(

xj)
=

xi
xj
"
=

Pi
Pj
1 Ri
Rj
(3.8)
The equations imply the following relation between the export and domestic cuto§ across
country.
xi = jA 8i; j (3.9)
Where A =
h
1 fxf
i 1
"
> 1:
B.2 Derivation of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
I will Önd the slopes of equation (2.23) lines to compare them.
B0(j) = fxf 1Ai

j
i
i1
< 0
D0(j) =  ffxAj

j
i
j1
< 0
Note that they have negative slope, hence now I can compare their absolute values(jB0(j)j 7
jD0(j)j). This can be simpliÖed to

fx
f
2
A(i+j) 7

i
j
ji
:
Now LHS can be simpliÖed to

fx
f
 2"(i+j)
"
 (1)
i+j
" : Note that fxf > 1 and 2" (i +
j) < 0: This imply that

fx
f
 2"(i+j)
"
(0; 1): On the other hand  > 1 and (1) < 0: This
imply that  (1)
i+j
" (0; 1): So we have LHS<1.
At any intersection of two curves, RHS imply that

i
j

> 1; since I have country "i" hazard
rate dominates the productivity distribution of country "j". But this imply that j  i > 0:
Hence RHS at the intersection will be grater than 1. So at any intersection the B(j) will be
falter than D(j). Since they both have negative slope we have a unique solution as well.
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Appendix C: Chapter 3
C Data
The following data description is useful for this paper. All variables are expressed in log.
Output is calculated from di§erence of gross output to building machinery and vehicles
produced for own use. from the table the expression for output in log levels is, y=ln(groutput-
prodbld-prodmach-prodveh).
Intermediates is constructed from four variables from the table. These are total interme-
diate purchase, electricity bought, Önal inventory of raw material and lastly initial inventory
of raw material. The expression for the variable is given by, m=ln(totipurc+elecbval-(Önvrm-
iinvrm)).
Labor input has only two components, skilled and unskilled workers. Their log of sum will
yield the labor input. The expression for this input is n=ln(sklab+unsklab).
Capital is log of tnk80_new, that is the real capital stock in PPP adjusted thousands of
1980 Chilean Pesos. The expression for this is self explanatory, k=ln(tnk80_new).
Investment is the summation of three variables and they are real gross capital investment
in building, real gross capital investment in machinery and real gross capital investment in
vehicles. The construction looks like, i=ln(rinvcapb+rinvcapm+rinvcapv).
Value added is the log of variable valadded and the expression is va=ln(valadded).
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